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Kavanaugh’s Foes Politicize the FBI

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Kristi Remington

October 1st, 2018, in the Wall Street Journal

The bipartisan bonhomie occasioned by the reopening of Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s background investigation dissipated quickly. By the weekend, Senate Democrats—who had demanded the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation—were challenging its credibility, objecting to its scope and focus, and lamenting that the White House had any involvement in shaping the process.

The reopened investigation, according to Sen. Lindsey Graham—reflecting the White House’s view—potentially entailed interviewing Deborah Ramirez, who claims that Judge Kavanaugh committed lewd conduct while a freshmen at Yale, and the three purported witnesses named by first accuser Christine Blasey Ford—Mark Judge, P.J. Smyth and Leland Keyser—all of whom have attested they have no memory that would corroborate her accusation. Julie Swetnick’s sordid and implausible claims were to be left out, and if any new allegations against Judge Kavanaugh were to emerge, these also wouldn’t be investigated.

President Trump told reporters Monday: “The FBI should interview anybody that they want within reason, but you have to say within reason.” That qualification is crucial. It is clear that Judge Kavanaugh’s opponents are clamoring for an open-ended fishing expedition that, probably by design, would go on much longer than a week. They are insisting that the FBI investigate Judge Kavanaugh’s drinking while in high school and college and interview anyone who might know about it. Two such people have already come forward, and there are no disincentives for new claimants, possibly driven by partisan or personal animus, to emerge.

Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) tried to justify his demand to broaden the FBI investigation by claiming that heavy drinking was “directly relevant” to the sexual-assault allegations. If this approach were adopted, the FBI would have to interview a very large pool of witnesses about Judge Kavanaugh’s alcohol intake, and possibly many other personal traits, over many years. Never mind that alcohol use is a standard FBI question, certainly asked in the course of Judge Kavanaugh’s previous six background investigations.

Kavanaugh foes also want the FBI to interview people who might challenge the credibility of pro-Kavanaugh witnesses. Mr. Judge is a prominent target here. His former girlfriend Elizabeth Rasor has stated publicly that he has disclosed to her facts relating to his past sexual activities that have nothing to do with Judge Kavanaugh, but cast Mr. Judge in a negative light. This approach could also open up a never-ending investigation, in which the FBI inquires into the credibility of all witnesses, whether pro- or anti-Kavanaugh, including witnesses interviewed to test other witnesses’ credibility.

The demands get even more absurd. “For its investigation to be comprehensive, the FBI must also get to the bottom of what ‘boofing’ means,” wrote Brian Fallon, who worked as press secretary for Hillary Clinton’s 2016 campaign, in Politico on Monday. That’s a reference to a joke in Mr. Kavanaugh’s high-school yearbook entry. As Mr. Fallon notes, “Kavanaugh said it referred to ‘flatulence.’ ”

The entire debate is complicated by confusion about what the FBI does in a background investigation. Even former Director James Comey is mixed up. He penned a vastly misleading New York Times op-ed Sunday, in which he seemed to conflate background checks with criminal probes. “It is one thing to have your lawyer submit a statement on your behalf,” Mr. Comey wrote. “It is a very different thing to sit across from two F.B.I. special agents and answer their relentless questions.”

The FBI is primarily a law-enforcement agency. Its criminal investigations are often wide-ranging, can be potentially expanded into new areas, and have no preset time limits. Although the president has authority under the Constitution to direct the exercise of all federal law-enforcement activities, in practice the FBI enjoys great autonomy when conducting criminal investigations. Agents seek both to uncover the facts and to assess the credibility of everybody they interview. Their questioning is often aggressive and repetitive. Interviewees are warned they will face criminal penalties if they lie to the FBI.

FBI background investigations are a fundamentally different affair. They are not based on any explicit statutory authorization but are founded on regulations authorizing investigations of persons who seek federal government employment. The bureau’s authority to conduct investigations of nominees dates to at least President Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10450 of 1953, though some scholars credit the beginning of the process to President Hoover and his request of Attorney General William Mitchell to investigate the qualification of applicants for judicial positions.

FBI background investigations are carried out by a special team within the bureau called Special Inquiry and General Background Investigations Unit. SIGBIU functions as a gatherer of facts. It doesn’t cajole or challenge witnesses and routinely offers them anonymity. It never proffers any credibility assessments or speculates about the motives of witnesses.

SIGBIU operates on tight deadlines and usually moves faster with Supreme Court nominations. The process begins and is completed well before the nominee’s Senate Judiciary Committee hearing takes place. Occasionally, SIGBIU is directed to conduct further interviews. Throughout the whole process, it operates under instructions from both the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office.

Significantly, there is a firewall between SIGBIU and FBI’s criminal-investigative divisions. SIGBIU’s goal is to have witnesses be open and forthcoming. Agents routinely assure witnesses that nothing that they say during the interview will be referred for criminal investigation. Even more fundamental, the FBI’s velvet-glove approach to background investigations reflects its recognition that people they interview are not suspected of any crimes and cannot be coerced into cooperating or threatened with a grand jury subpoena.

Running a background investigation as if it were a criminal one would destroy the FBI’s ability to conduct the former. It would cause many Americans to refuse to cooperate. It would cause the bureau to exceed its constitutionally proper remit. And having the FBI proffer credibility determinations in the context of a judicial appointment would politicize the bureau—and, as then-Sen. Joe Biden correctly asserted during Justice Clarence Thomas’s 1991 confirmation hearings, it would usurp a function that properly belongs to the president and the Senate.

The demands by anti-Kavanaugh Democrats are blatantly partisan and unfair. What they seek has never been done with any judicial nominee in American history. They also run afoul of important legal and practical realities of FBI-conducted background investigations. If countenanced, they would politicize the FBI and destroy the judicial confirmation process.

Mr. Rivkin practices appellate and constitutional law in Washington. He served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Ms. Remington served in the Justice Department during George W. Bush administration. She was responsible for overseeing the judicial nomination and confirmation process, including for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/kavanaughs-foes-politicize-the-fbi-1538433332

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Kavanaugh and the Ginsburgh Standard

Don’t blame Brett Kavanaugh when he demurs at his confirmation hearing from answering questions on legal issues that might come before the Supreme Court. It’s the senators who will be in the wrong, for demanding commitments that no judicious nominee could provide. To answer “direct questions on stare decisis on many other matters, including Roe and health care”—as Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has called for—would itself be disqualifying.

That principle has come to be called the Ginsburg Standard, after Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. As she explained in the opening statement of her 1993 confirmation hearing: “A judge sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no hints, for that would show not only disregard for the specifics of the particular case—it would display disdain for the entire judicial process.” Or, as she later responded to a question about constitutional protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation: “No hints, no forecasts, no previews.”

It would be a mistake to associate the rule too closely with Justice Ginsburg, who honored it inconsistently at her hearing, or to view it as driven only by policy considerations. In fact, the standard has deep roots in the law and history.

Begin with the Constitution. The Appointments Clause provides that judges, including Supreme Court justices, are appointed by the president “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” From the nomination of John Jay as the first chief justice in 1789 through the mid-1950s, public confirmation hearings were rare. Few nominees attended them when they did occur, and only a handful testified. Senators had no occasion to grandstand by demanding that a nominee declare his stance on legal controversies.

Since hearings became the norm, the number of questions asked of nominees has exploded, with recent nominees facing more than 700 apiece. Yet two aspects of the process haven’t changed. The first is the refusal of nominees to opine on actual or hypothetical cases that may come before the high court. The second is senators’ griping in response. At a 1968 hearing, Sen. Sam Ervin (D., N.C.) bemoaned that the nominee, Judge Homer Thornberry, had “virtually created a new right not found in the Constitution, which might well be designated as the judicial appointee’s right to refrain from self-incrimination.”

Ervin was wrong. Judges are appointed to exercise the “judicial power.” As per the Constitution, this involves deciding specific “cases” or “controversies”—that is, concrete disputes involving real facts, as opposed to abstract questions of law. Judging, in turn, entails the application of law to the facts of a particular case. The facts matter greatly: The way in which the circumstances of a given case can be distinguished from one in the past or one in the future is often what creates the basis for a legal rule, because it is that distinction that becomes legally material.

Judges don’t decide cases in a vacuum or through divine inspiration. They do it in the crucible of adversarial testing. Appellate judges read the parties’ briefs. They hear the lawyers’ arguments. They review the precedents and the factual record. Then they piece it all together, rendering a decision that, in Justice Ginsburg’s formulation, “should turn on those facts and the governing law, stated and explained in light of the particular arguments the parties or their representatives present.” Opining on a legal question divorced from the context of a particular case is not judging at all. It is speculation, a guess as to what the right rule might be.

In that sense, a senatorial demand that a nominee take one side or the other on a given “issue” is futile. Who is to say which of any number of possible factual circumstances might be relevant when, because there is no case, there are no facts? How can anyone judge the correctness of an argument when, because there are no parties, no one has argued for or against it? Answering at all would be deceptive.

It also would run up against another constitutional guidepost, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law. Litigants are entitled to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal,” including a judge who is impartial and whose mind is not implacably closed to persuasion. A nominee’s advance commitment to decide a question a certain way is incompatible with the appearance of fairness and impartiality that gives the law its legitimacy. It also compromises the independence of the judicial branch, a crucial check on overreaching by the political branches. Even a judge who has a decided an issue in an earlier case remains open to the prospect of going the other way in a later case, on different facts or different arguments. A judge who exchanges a commitment for a confirmation vote—or merely appears to do so—will forever be tainted.

All this holds true for issues already decided by the court, given that what constitutes “settled law” on the Supreme Court is in the eyes of the beholder. Nearly any issue may arise again, and the justices, unlike their counterparts on lower courts, are free to reconsider high-court precedent.

This week senators would do well to stick to more illuminating lines of inquiry: the more than 300 written opinions Judge Kavanaugh issued over his 12 years on the bench, his speeches and articles, his judicial philosophy, his character. There is no legitimate reason to demand hints, forecasts and previews that Judge Kavanaugh is duty-bound to deny.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. Mr. Rivkin served at the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office. Mr. Grossman is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/kavanaugh-and-the-ginsburg-standard-1536010512

Why Mueller can’t subpoena Trump

Donald Trump’s lawyers have signaled he won’t agree to a voluntary interview with special counsel Robert Mueller. If Mr. Mueller insists, he will have to subpoena the president. To enforce a subpoena, the special counsel would have to go to court and meet a highly exacting standard, showing what he wants and why he needs it. He would be unlikely to succeed, given that Mr. Trump already has cooperated extensively with the investigation, producing 1.4 million documents and making dozens of White House staffers available for interviews.

The leading precedent is a 1997 opinion, In re Sealed Case, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The case involved the independent counsel investigation of former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy, who was accused of receiving unlawful gifts. The independent counsel sought to obtain sensitive documents produced in the course of an internal White House inquiry. These materials involved the preparation of a report to then-President Clinton himself. Although Mr. Clinton had directed that most of the materials be provided, he asserted executive privilege to withhold some items.

At issue in particular was information regarding whether Mr. Clinton should discipline or fire Mr. Espy, who did resign. To justify producing such sensitive materials involving “the exercise of [the president’s] appointment and removal power, a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power,” the court required the independent counsel to demonstrate with “specificity” why he needed the materials and why he could not get them, or equivalent evidence, from another source. (Mr. Espy was acquitted in 1998.)

Mr. Mueller’s initial charge was to investigate Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government. But his investigation has expanded to cover whether Mr. Trump has obstructed justice. The president’s critics say his obstructive acts include urging then-FBI Director James Comey to “go easy” on former national security adviser Mike Flynn, subsequently firing Mr. Comey, and his public criticism of Mr. Mueller, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.

There are significant factual disputes about these episodes, but all involve the president’s exercise of his core constitutional powers as chief executive, including the power to appoint and remove high-level executive-branch officials, to supervise the performance of their duties (as in the Espy case), and to determine law-enforcement priorities. We have argued in these pages that the president cannot obstruct justice by exercising the discretionary powers of his office, especially in determining whether and why to fire high-level presidential appointees like Mr. Comey. According to the two leaked letters from Mr. Trump’s lawyers to Mr. Mueller, they take essentially the same view.

Any prosecution based on Mr. Trump’s exercise of his core constitutional authority would dramatically impair the executive’s status as a coequal branch of government, considering that Congress enjoys immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause while exercising its legislative powers. It would also inject the judiciary into the president’s decision-making process, requiring judges to delve into matters that are inherently political.

Developments over the past year reinforce our view that it would unconstitutionally debilitate the presidency to base an obstruction charge on gainsaying the president’s motives in exercising his core responsibilities. Mr. Trump’s critics have also accused him of obstructing justice by using his pardon power. They claim his pardons of Joe Arpaio, Scooter Libby and Dinesh D’Souza —whom he considers victims of previous political prosecutions—were meant to reassure targets of Mr. Mueller’s probe that they too might be pardoned. Under such logic, a president under investigation could not discharge his constitutional duties at all, including the use of military force overseas—which can always be cast as a “wag the dog” strategy.

These considerations distinguish Mr. Trump’s situation from that of Mr. Clinton, who in August 1998 became the only sitting president to appear before a grand jury. That independent-counsel investigation did not concern the exercise of presidential authority. They concerned allegations of perjury and obstruction from Mr. Clinton’s personal relationship with a White House intern. Independent counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed the president but withdrew the subpoena when Mr. Clinton agreed to appear voluntarily by video. Because constitutional considerations were not in play, the In re Sealed Case analysis would not have favored the president. (The same might apply if New York-based federal prosecutors attempt to subpoena Mr. Trump in connection with Michael Cohen’s guilty plea on charges unrelated to presidential power, although there are other reasons why such a subpoena would neither be issued nor enforced.)

We also now know that Mr. Trump authorized White House counsel Don McGahn to answer all of Mr. Mueller’s questions regarding every alleged obstructive action. According to press reports, Mr. McGahn spent nearly 30 hours describing the substance of his conversations with Mr. Trump and offering his assessment that the president’s actions were lawful.

With access to the relevant documents and everyone around the president, the special counsel has no material facts left to find. Interviewing or interrogating the president could shed additional light only on his own thoughts and motives—exactly what executive privilege is designed to protect. They relate entirely to a constitutionally proscribed obstruction inquiry that would violate the separation of powers.

Applying the In re Sealed Case standard, Mr. Mueller cannot show that any need for Mr. Trump’s testimony outweighs the president’s interest in keeping his thoughts private. The president hasn’t asserted executive privilege vis-à-vis the special-counsel investigation. But if Mr. Mueller seeks his testimony directly, he can and should. Mr. Mueller knows that losing a subpoena court fight would prolong and delegitimize his investigation. He is unlikely to press the point.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s Office and Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-mueller-cant-subpoena-trump-1534973736

Trump is right on Nord Stream 2

President Trump was right to criticize Chancellor Angela Merkel’s plan for a new pipeline carrying Russian natural gas to Germany. This project threatens European independence and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and it was opposed by the Obama administration and many Senate Democrats, although not much was done to stop the pipeline’s construction. Numerous European countries have also been sharply critical of Mrs. Merkel’s energy plans. Mr. Trump has correctly sought to diminish Moscow’s European energy footprint, belying claims he is a stooge of Vladimir Putin.

In 2015 the European Commission cited Russia’s politically motivated disruptions of energy exports as one of the main causes of Europe’s energy insecurity. Moscow is the largest energy exporter to Europe; Gazprom alone supplied almost 40% of Europe’s natural gas in 2017. According to World Bank data, Gazprom’s European gas prices last year were more than double the U.S. domestic price. Russia has also repeatedly used its gas to blackmail Europe, cutting off the supply in 2006, 2009 and 2014, and causing severe shortages in Eastern Europe.

Germany has sought for years to maintain a special energy relationship with Moscow as a means of securing its own energy-supply predominance in Europe. Once the Nord Steam expansion is completed, it will account for 80% of Russian gas imported to Europe, making Germany the Continent’s major gas-distribution hub.

The Nord Stream 2 project has received particularly strong support from the center-left Social Democratic Party, a key member of Mrs. Merkel’s shaky governing coalition. Gerhard Schröder, a former SPD chancellor, has served as chairman of Nord Stream 2 AG, a Gazprom-owned consortium.

Berlin signed the original Nord Stream pipeline deal with Russia during Mr. Schröder’s chancellorship in 2005. In 2017 the Russian government nominated Mr. Schröder to the board of Rosneft, the Russian oil giant. German media report that Mr. Schröder was paid some €250,000 annually at Gazprom, and is expected to be paid €300,000 to €425,000 at Rosneft. But Germans have largely shrugged at the spectacle of a former chancellor on Russia’s payroll.

Many other European countries, however, have been critical of Germany’s Russian-energy romance. Thirteen EU states vehemently oppose the Nord Stream expansion. They are concerned about the loss of transit-fee revenue from existing pipelines that run mostly through Ukraine and the security risk of Russia’s growing dominance over Europe’s gas market. They have demanded the European Commission transfer negotiating power over the pipeline from Germany to the EU.

The new pipeline would enhance Russia’s blackmail capability by enabling Moscow to cut off gas supplies to Eastern Europe without subjecting Western Europe to the same treatment. Not surprisingly, Eastern European states have taken the lead in trying to develop alternatives. In 2016 Croatia and Poland led the formation of the Three Seas Initiative, or 3SI, which united 12 states from the Baltics to the Balkans.

At a 3SI summit in Warsaw in June 2017, Mr. Trump pledged that the U.S. would bolster exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe so the Continent “can never be held hostage to a single supplier.” That statement was anchored in the administration’s broader strategy of transforming the U.S. into a pre-eminent low-cost global energy supplier.

Russia’s gas stranglehold is a source of vulnerability as well as power. Europe accounts for more than 80% of Gazprom’s exports. Energy accounts for almost half of Russia’s exports and 40% of its national budget. The implementation of a 3SI energy plan would drain Russia’s pocketbook and frustrate its geopolitical ambitions.

Moscow has recognized the challenge and done its best to block efforts to diversify European energy supplies. Russian proxies have moved to delay or stop the 3SI project. According to the Croatian media, Gasfin, a Luxembourg company acting as Gazprom’s cat’s-paw in Europe, is supporting local environmentalists opposed to construction of a new LNG terminal on Croatia’s Krk Island. Gasfin has even purchased land on the island so that it can hobble the project via legal challenges—while at the same time suggesting that Gazprom might support the Krk project if it receives only Russian gas. During Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic’s visit to Russia last October, Mr. Putin publicly offered a partnership to gasify Croatia.

Mr. Trump’s leadership on this issue has had tangible results. Poland has committed to buying LNG from the U.S. and has already completed a new LNG terminal. It will not renew a contract with Gazprom set to expire in 2022, ending a 74-year exclusive partnership. U.S. LNG imports to Europe rose 22% last year, and will likely keep growing.

Yet the fate of 3SI is uncertain. The Trump administration should ramp up its energy strategy in two ways. First, promote U.S. investment in all facets of 3SI projects. Second, nudge European countries to accept a long-term package of sanctions on Russian energy, patterned after Carter- and Reagan-era sanctions, including restrictions on technology transfers and financing of Russian gas production and exports. If the Europeans balk, the U.S. should impose such sanctions unilaterally.

An all-out U.S. effort to stop Nord Stream 2 would help restore credibility in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit. Over time, this strategy would reduce Moscow’s European gas exports dramatically, freeing Europe from Moscow’s blackmail. American energy exports to Europe would be reliable and fairly priced. More Americans would have jobs, trans-Atlantic ties would be stronger, and it would be a major blow to the Putin regime.

Mr. Rivkin, a constitutional litigator, served in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations at the White House Counsel’s Office and the Energy and Justice departments. Mr. Zuzul is a former Croatian foreign minister and ambassador to the U.S.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-is-right-on-nord-stream-2-1532289915

Mueller’s Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Trump has the Constitution on his side

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

June 12, 2018 in the Washington Post

The Constitution vests all executive power in the president. He has the authority to determine what matters will, and will not, be investigated and prosecuted by the U.S. government. This is also a core part of the president’s obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” — and it remains so even if done through an unorthodox channel such as Twitter.

So it is puzzling to see so much criticism of President Trump’s demand that the Justice Department investigate allegations about his presidential campaign being improperly subjected to an FBI counterintelligence probe. Same goes for his instruction to the Justice Department and the FBI that they should grant congressional requests for information about that matter.

Indeed, Trump would have been well within his authority, and well within precedent, to order an investigation entirely independent of the Justice Department and the FBI, as President Lyndon B. Johnson did when he created, by executive order, the Warren Commission to investigate the circumstances of President John F. Kennedy’s death.

When critics claim that a president cannot direct federal law-enforcement activities, they are implying that subordinate executive-branch officials can both judge and act upon their own assessment of a president’s motivations. There is no basis in the Constitution’s language, statute or Supreme Court precedent for such a notion. Those who object to a president’s instructions may resign, but they cannot usurp executive authority and defy him.

Imagine a world where this kind of insulation from presidential control existed. Such a system would create more opportunities for misconduct than the constitutionally enshrined system. Unlike appointed officials and employees, the president is accountable to the electorate. If he misuses his power, the voters can punish him. And if he abuses his authority, Congress can remove him from office through impeachment proceedings. By contrast, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was, for all practical purposes, insulated from presidential control, his tenure lasted decades and encompassed law-enforcement abuses and civil rights violations.

Only in one post-Watergate statute did Congress limit the president’s ability to oversee criminal investigations by providing for appointment of an independent counsel who could be removed only for cause. The Supreme Court upheld this law in Morrison v. Olson, even though it trenched upon the president’s executive authority, concluding that the statute did not unduly limit the president’s power because the imposition was slight. Effectively treating all federal prosecutors as independent and placing the entire federal law-enforcement apparatus beyond the president’s supervision would fly in the face of Morrison.

Besides, with accountability being a paramount constitutional virtue, there is another fundamental constitutional problem with the kind of insulation that Trump’s critics propose. Congressionally mandated insulation of independent counsels at least left Congress politically accountable.

By contrast, bureaucratic self-­insulation is inherently imprecise and destroys accountability. And unlike the statutorily based insulation that the Supreme Court reviewed in Morrison, self-insulation evades judicial review. This is anathema to our constitutional architecture and the rule of law.

Similarly, the Justice Department’s assertion of executive privilege to shield from disclosure documents — such as those sought by Congress on federal surveillance of the Trump campaign — is also a core presidential function. This power is grounded in the president’s right — as the head of a co-equal branch of government — to maintain his independence and do his job. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Nixon, in which White House tape recordings of the president’s own conversations were at issue, the “privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”

The court found, of course, that the privilege is not absolute. In Nixon and other cases, courts have required production of confidential executive materials. None has suggested, however, that a president’s voluntary decision to provide materials to Congress can be gainsaid, either by subordinate executive-branch officials or the courts. If the president determines to provide such materials to Congress, then the relevant agency officials must comply with his decision or resign. They have no legal authority to overrule such a presidential decision or to impose additional conditions on how Congress handles these materials.

This is true, though the documents being sought involve law-­enforcement materials. Indeed, as explained in a letter to Congress by Attorney General William French Smith in 1982, it has been Justice Department policy since at least President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration not to withhold such documents if they may “contain evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials.” Thus, to the extent Justice Department officials now object to Trump’s orders to provide the materials Congress seeks regarding surveillance of his presidential campaign, those objections cannot be sustained even under the department’s own policies.

Whatever one feels about the wisdom of Trump’s directives, fidelity to the Constitution best protects our democracy in the long run.

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, who practice appellate and constitutional law in the District, served in the Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Rivkin also served in the White House counsel’s office in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Source: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-trump-has-the-power-to-investigate-the-fbis-probe-of-his-campaign/2018/06/12/dfaf7f84-6e5a-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html

 

Mark Janus Was With Hillary, Whether or Not He Wanted to Be

Flash back to the Las Vegas Convention Center, July 19, 2016. The floor overflows with people chanting, “We’re with her!” A speaker proclaims, to cheers and applause, that we “will stand with her in every corner of this nation.” Then Hillary Clinton takes the stage as the crowd rises in a standing ovation. She thanks them for supporting her campaign and rallies them to knock on doors and get out the vote.

The event wasn’t organized by the campaign. It was the 2016 convention of the nation’s largest union representing public-sector workers, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The state of Illinois forced Mark Janus —an Illinois employee who refused to join the union—to pay for a portion that pro-Hillary rally.

Across the U.S., more than 500,000 state and local workers have objected to funding union advocacy but are nonetheless required by law to pay “fair share” fees to labor unions they have refused to join. The Supreme Court upheld the practice in a 1977 case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, reasoning that otherwise workers could “free ride” on the union’s collective bargaining. Prohibiting unions from charging nonmembers directly for political speech, it believed, would protect their First Amendment rights.

On Monday the justices will hear oral arguments in a challenge to that 1977 decision brought by Mr. Janus. They should heed Justice Felix Frankfurter’s observation, in an earlier case on mandatory union fees, that it is “rather naive” to assume “that economic and political concerns are separable.” As Mr. Janus argues, bargaining over wages, pensions and benefits in the public sector involves issues of intense public concern and thus core First Amendment-protected speech. A state law that forces public employees to fund that speech violates their rights, no less than compelling them to speak. ( Janus v. Afscme doesn’t consider these questions for unions in the private sector.)

Other unions that held pro-Clinton rallies include the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association and the Service Employees International Union, which represents about one million public workers. The SEIU convention passed a resolution that the union will “elect Hillary Clinton” as president “by mobilizing millions of voters.” Unions and state governments maintain that nonmembers can be charged for these conventions because they are where the unions adopt bargaining strategies and representational policies.

Afscme used its convention to weigh in on practically every major political issue. One resolution condemned Senate Republicans and demanded hearings and a vote on Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court. Others addressed funding for public infrastructure, educational spending, paid family and sick leave, private contracting of government services, the minimum wage, and “right to work” laws, with each resolution taking the expected union position.

More surprising were resolutions with no obvious connection to union interests—demanding gun-control laws, statehood for the District of Columbia, marijuana legalization, “comprehensive immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship,” “racial justice” and an end to state laws that protect religious freedom. Whatever Mr. Janus’s positions on these issues, he was forced to fund Afscme’s advocacy on them.

The American Federation of Teachers has charged nonmembers for advocacy supporting public funding for Planned Parenthood, the “climate justice movement” and a constitutional amendment to restrict political speech by overturning Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission—which, ironically, protects union as well as corporate speech.

But the National Education Association takes the cake. Its current resolutions stake out positions on topics from the adoption of constitutional amendments through the convention process of the Constitution’s Article V (NEA is opposed), to American participation in the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court (thumbs up), to “covert operations and counterintelligence activities,” along with the “self-determination of indigenous people.” The NEA has spent objectors’ money on advocacy in favor of racial preferences, comprehensive sex education, restoration of voting rights for felons, and adoption of the metric system by the U.S.

Yes, the metric system.

These unions also charge nonmembers for training programs embodying the same political outlook. A recent AFT conference in Detroit featured sessions on participating in “the Resistance,” “fighting against Trump and [Education Secretary Betsy ] DeVos, ” and “organizing a sanctuary campus” to block participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The NEA, meanwhile, uses nonmembers’ fees to produce materials for teachers addressing “social justice” issues, such as “diversity,” “privilege,” and “hierarchies of oppression.”

These details reflect the basic truth that labor unions are political organizations. Everything they do, from massive political expenditures to bargaining activities, is shot through with political purpose and consideration. Under the First Amendment, they have the right to politic in all these ways—just as Mr. Janus has the right not to pay for it.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice constitutional and appellate law in Washington. Mr. Grossman filed a brief on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute supporting Mr. Janus.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-janus-was-with-hillary-whether-or-not-he-wanted-to-be-1519341922