Category Archives: law

A Champion of Constitutional Safeguards

Days before President Trump announced his choice of Judge Brett Kavanaugh for the Supreme Court, Senate Democrats had vowed to oppose any nominee. Backed by an activist-fueled propaganda machine, they now will unleash relentless personal attacks—on Judge Kavanaugh’s Catholic faith, his “elitist” Yale degrees, his service in the George W. Bush administration.

As with the attacks last year on Justice Neil Gorsuch, they should be unavailing. Over Judge Kavanaugh’s 12 years on the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, he has developed an impressive record as a legal thinker and a champion of the Constitution’s structural safeguards against overweening government.

Typical is a 2008 dissent in which Judge Kavanaugh concluded that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was unconstitutionally structured because it improperly insulated the agency from political accountability. The opinion was a tour de force of historical exposition and originalist methodology—that is, interpreting the Constitution’s text as it was originally understood. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, adopting the reasoning of Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.

Yet he is equally wary of unbridled executive authority, as a 2013 case shows. When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to proceed with licensing the proposed waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev., which the agency appeared to oppose on policy grounds, he wrote: “The President may not decline to follow a statutory mandate or prohibition simply because of policy objections.”

In articles and speeches as well as formal opinions, Judge Kavanaugh has been a leading critic of Chevron deference, the courts’ practice of giving agencies free rein to interpret their own statutory authority. In a 2016 law-review article, he wrote that Chevron encourages the executive branch “to be extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and restraints,” cutting Congress out of the picture. “The American rule of law, as I see it, depends on neutral, impartial judges who say what the law is.”

On that score, Judge Kavanaugh rivals the late Justice Antonin Scalia in his ability to make sense of Congress’s often knotty statutory constructions. Judge Kavanaugh considers textualism to be an important restraint on judges that prevents them from imposing their policy preferences. As he put it in that 2016 article: “When courts apply doctrines that allow them to rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power.”

That’s why the Democrats’ formulaic charges of partisanship won’t stick. In case after case, Judge Kavanaugh sided with the Obama administration in the war on terror. He turned away a constitutional challenge to ObamaCare on jurisdictional grounds, while writing that the government’s defenses of the law were “unprecedented” and without “principled limit.”

Across three successive administrations, Judge Kavanaugh has frequently ruled against the government. According to Jennifer Mascott of Scalia Law School, he “has written 40 opinions finding agency action to be unlawful and joined majority opinions reversing agency action in at least 35 additional cases.” That’s a muscular record on a court often criticized for deference to government.

Democrats may make an issue of a 1998 academic article in which Judge Kavanaugh—who early in his career worked in the Office of Independent Counsel during the Clinton administration—questioned whether the Constitution permits criminal prosecution of a sitting president. He didn’t actually reach a conclusion on the question, but the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel did, holding that a sitting president cannot be indicted. Since that opinion is binding on special counsel Robert Mueller, there’s no prospect the issue will reach the Supreme Court.

Democrats will also roll out culture-war issues like abortion and same-sex marriage. There is nothing in Judge Kavanaugh’s judicial or scholarly record to indicate how he would vote on any of those issues. Only one sitting justice, Clarence Thomas, has said he favors overturning Roe v. Wade, so the status quo on abortion seems likely to prevail for some time. As for same-sex marriage, there appears to be little appetite on the court to revisit it, and even less reason to believe that a case doing so is likely to arise, given its rapid public acceptance.

At any rate, it would be improper for Judge Kavanaugh to answer senators’ questions about how he would vote on any particular issue. Since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s appointment in 1993, her “Ginsburg Rule”—“no hints, no forecasts, no previews”—has stood. Judges do not decide abstract issues but concrete cases with specific facts, arguments, and governing law. Judges have a duty to decide cases as they arise, without prejudgment. Like Justice Ginsburg, Judge Kavanaugh can and should be questioned on his record. And a fine record it is.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. Mr. Rivkin served at the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office. Mr. Grossman is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-champion-of-constitutional-safeguards-1531189515

 

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Trump has the Constitution on his side

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

June 12, 2018 in the Washington Post

The Constitution vests all executive power in the president. He has the authority to determine what matters will, and will not, be investigated and prosecuted by the U.S. government. This is also a core part of the president’s obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” — and it remains so even if done through an unorthodox channel such as Twitter.

So it is puzzling to see so much criticism of President Trump’s demand that the Justice Department investigate allegations about his presidential campaign being improperly subjected to an FBI counterintelligence probe. Same goes for his instruction to the Justice Department and the FBI that they should grant congressional requests for information about that matter.

Indeed, Trump would have been well within his authority, and well within precedent, to order an investigation entirely independent of the Justice Department and the FBI, as President Lyndon B. Johnson did when he created, by executive order, the Warren Commission to investigate the circumstances of President John F. Kennedy’s death.

When critics claim that a president cannot direct federal law-enforcement activities, they are implying that subordinate executive-branch officials can both judge and act upon their own assessment of a president’s motivations. There is no basis in the Constitution’s language, statute or Supreme Court precedent for such a notion. Those who object to a president’s instructions may resign, but they cannot usurp executive authority and defy him.

Imagine a world where this kind of insulation from presidential control existed. Such a system would create more opportunities for misconduct than the constitutionally enshrined system. Unlike appointed officials and employees, the president is accountable to the electorate. If he misuses his power, the voters can punish him. And if he abuses his authority, Congress can remove him from office through impeachment proceedings. By contrast, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was, for all practical purposes, insulated from presidential control, his tenure lasted decades and encompassed law-enforcement abuses and civil rights violations.

Only in one post-Watergate statute did Congress limit the president’s ability to oversee criminal investigations by providing for appointment of an independent counsel who could be removed only for cause. The Supreme Court upheld this law in Morrison v. Olson, even though it trenched upon the president’s executive authority, concluding that the statute did not unduly limit the president’s power because the imposition was slight. Effectively treating all federal prosecutors as independent and placing the entire federal law-enforcement apparatus beyond the president’s supervision would fly in the face of Morrison.

Besides, with accountability being a paramount constitutional virtue, there is another fundamental constitutional problem with the kind of insulation that Trump’s critics propose. Congressionally mandated insulation of independent counsels at least left Congress politically accountable.

By contrast, bureaucratic self-­insulation is inherently imprecise and destroys accountability. And unlike the statutorily based insulation that the Supreme Court reviewed in Morrison, self-insulation evades judicial review. This is anathema to our constitutional architecture and the rule of law.

Similarly, the Justice Department’s assertion of executive privilege to shield from disclosure documents — such as those sought by Congress on federal surveillance of the Trump campaign — is also a core presidential function. This power is grounded in the president’s right — as the head of a co-equal branch of government — to maintain his independence and do his job. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Nixon, in which White House tape recordings of the president’s own conversations were at issue, the “privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”

The court found, of course, that the privilege is not absolute. In Nixon and other cases, courts have required production of confidential executive materials. None has suggested, however, that a president’s voluntary decision to provide materials to Congress can be gainsaid, either by subordinate executive-branch officials or the courts. If the president determines to provide such materials to Congress, then the relevant agency officials must comply with his decision or resign. They have no legal authority to overrule such a presidential decision or to impose additional conditions on how Congress handles these materials.

This is true, though the documents being sought involve law-­enforcement materials. Indeed, as explained in a letter to Congress by Attorney General William French Smith in 1982, it has been Justice Department policy since at least President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration not to withhold such documents if they may “contain evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials.” Thus, to the extent Justice Department officials now object to Trump’s orders to provide the materials Congress seeks regarding surveillance of his presidential campaign, those objections cannot be sustained even under the department’s own policies.

Whatever one feels about the wisdom of Trump’s directives, fidelity to the Constitution best protects our democracy in the long run.

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, who practice appellate and constitutional law in the District, served in the Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Rivkin also served in the White House counsel’s office in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Source: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-trump-has-the-power-to-investigate-the-fbis-probe-of-his-campaign/2018/06/12/dfaf7f84-6e5a-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html

 

What’s at Stake in the Attack on Haspel

Gina Haspel reportedly offered last week to withdraw her nomination as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The White House declined and now must stand behind her as she faces an unjustified assault involving the Bush administration’s enhanced-interrogation program.

Shortly after 9/11, the administration concluded that it needed to obtain as much actionable intelligence as possible to avert future attacks. It decided to explore, and ultimately adopted, the use of interrogation methods against some al Qaeda operatives far more rigorous than would have been permissible against lawful prisoners of war.

The administration was properly mindful of U.S. statutes and obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Even unlawful enemy combatants may not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. Where to draw the line? It was not for the CIA, much less Ms. Haspel, to answer that question, but for the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which advises federal agencies on the law.

OLC’s guidance, in the form of several memos issued in 2002 and 2003, was communicated through the CIA’s general counsel to agents in the field and was the basis on which the enhanced-interrogation program was carried out. The guidance was precise and unambiguous. It listed all the legally permissible interrogation techniques, backed up by appropriate safeguards. The details of this program were fully and repeatedly briefed to the so-called congressional Gang of Eight—the House and Senate majority and minority leaders and chairmen and ranking members of the intelligence committees. None raised a word of objection.

But as the fear of terrorism receded, one of OLC’s memos was leaked to the press, in June 2004. It ignited a debate, in and out of government, over what the administration’s opponents labeled “torture.” (We supported the administration in these pages.) OLC soon withdrew that memo and issued revised guidance on Dec. 30, 2004. Although narrower and more cautiously reasoned than the original, the new guidance stated unequivocally that “we have reviewed this Office’s prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.”

The CIA program ended in November 2007, and President Obama formally banned coercive interrogations in January 2009. Congress also passed a series of statutes limiting the CIA’s interrogation protocols to the benign techniques featured in the U.S. Army Field Manuals.

To assuage concerns about Ms. Haspel’s career, the CIA has offered to make the relevant materials available to the Senate for review behind closed doors. It should resist the request of some senators to declassify her entire personnel file. Since Ms. Haspel spent almost her whole career in clandestine service, was posted overseas on numerous occasions, and ran covert assets against hard targets, such disclosure would be certain to expose sensitive operations, jeopardize the safety of U.S. and allied intelligence agents, and damage national security.

Ms. Haspel has been criticized for her role in the CIA’s 2005 destruction of videotapes showing interrogations. At the time, she served as chief of staff to Jose Rodriguez, director of clandestine programs, who authorized the destruction. Given the existence of written transcripts, which included descriptions of the specific interrogation techniques being used, retention of the tapes was not required by law or regulation. There was also justifiable concern that the tapes might be leaked someday, revealing the identity of covert CIA operatives. When Mr. Obama’s deputy CIA director, Mike Morrell, investigated the matter, he wrote that he “found no fault with the performance of Ms. Haspel,” who had acted “appropriately.” Mr. Rodriguez was reprimanded only for not obtaining explicit approval of his superiors before destroying the tapes.

What is at stake here is not just the career of a courageous, dedicated public servant. Like other government employees, intelligence officers cannot ignore the policy decisions of their political superiors. Those appointees, and ultimately the president, are accountable for their actions—as are the congressional leaders who raised no objection to enhanced interrogation at the time. If agents are blamed following the directives of their superiors, the CIA’s ability to protect the U.S. will be fundamentally compromised.

The White House is right to stand behind Ms. Haspel—not only because she risked life and limb in the service of her country, but because of the important principles at stake.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s Office and Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-at-stake-in-the-attack-on-haspel-1525731820

Unappointed ‘Judges’ Shouldn’t Be Trying Cases

The Justices Lay Down the Law

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

June 27, 2017, in the Wall Street Journal

In one of the last decisions of its term, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a clear rebuke to politicized lower courts. The justices’ unanimous ruling in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project upholds both the integrity of the judiciary and the Supreme Court’s own authority.

The case came to the justices from two federal appellate courts. They had upheld trial judges’ orders halting enforcement of President Trump’s “travel ban” executive order, which temporarily limits entry to the U.S. by nationals from six countries. The court will hear the appeal on the merits in October. On Tuesday it held unanimously that the executive order can be immediately enforced, with narrow exceptions, until they address the merits of these cases in the fall.

The challenges to the order claimed it violated the First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom and exceeded the president’s authority under immigration law. Both the substance and tone of these decisions created an unmistakable impression that a portion of the judiciary has joined the anti-Trump “resistance.” Not only did the lower-court judges defy clear and binding Supreme Court precedent, they based much of their legal analysis, incredibly, on Candidate Trump’s campaign rhetoric.

The high court didn’t rule entirely in the administration’s favor. By a 6-3 vote, with Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch dissenting, it held that the individuals who originally challenged the order could continue to do so, as could a carefully defined class of “similarly situated” persons with “close familial” relationships to individuals in the United States, along with institutions that can show a “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course” relationship to a U.S. entity.

That, the court specifically cautioned, is not an invitation for evasion by immigration advocates: “For example, a nonprofit group devoted to immigration issues may not contact foreign nationals from the designated countries, add them to client lists, and then secure their entry by claiming injury from their exclusion.”

That exception, Justice Thomas noted for the dissenters, was a “compromise”—most likely the product of Chief Justice John Roberts’s effort to achieve a unanimous decision. Given the circumstances, this was a good outcome. It lends the imprimatur of the full court to the rebuke of the lower courts, and avoids the kind of partisan split that prevailed in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. All nine justices are also now on record supporting the proposition that the vast majority of foreign nationals cannot claim a constitutional right to enter the United States.

When the court reviews the merits of the case in the fall, however, such considerations will be out of place. While courts can adjudicate cases involving immigration and other foreign affairs issues, judicial engagement in this space is fundamentally different than in domestic affairs. In an area of decision-making that involves both institutional knowledge of international affairs and continuous access to classified information, great deference is in order from the courts. If the courts wade into this area, they would undermine both national security and respect for the judiciary. The perception that judging is swayed by political or ideological considerations would be particularly calamitous in this area. Better a 5-4 decision articulating this view clearly than a unanimous but equivocal one.

The odds of a clear outcome are good. As Justice Thomas pointed out, his colleagues’ “implicit conclusion” is that the administration is likely to prevail on the merits. The high court’s own precedent in this area is clear. Nonresident aliens have no constitutional right to enter the U.S. When denying entry, the president need only provide a “facially legitimate and bona fide” justification. As the court held in Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), once that justification is established, there is no further inquiry or balancing for the courts to make.

Any other decision would be both inconsistent with the court’s precedent and injurious to the Constitution’s separation of powers. It would also compromise the president’s ability to defend the nation at home and abroad and cause grave harm to the judicial branch in maintaining its own critical constitutional role.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-justices-lay-down-the-law-1498604382

In Texas, judges waive bail for the indigent, distorting the Constitution

by DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. & LEE A. CASEY

May 31, 2017, in the National Review

The Constitution protects arrestees against “excessive bail.” This guarantee, however, has never been understood to provide indigents the right to a zero-dollar bail simply because they cannot afford more. That, however, is the clear import of in ODonnell v. Harris County, a recent decision by a federal district court in Houston. Unless reversed on appeal, such a rule would require the release of any arrestee, irrespective of the seriousness of the charges being brought, who claims that he or she cannot afford bail — even if the arrestee has a history of failing to appear for trial. This would have wide-ranging implications for how the balance is struck between the rights of criminal defendants and society at large. And policy consequences aside, another judge-engineered right would enter the Constitution’s firmament.

The ODonnell case is part of a recent wave of lawsuits asking unelected federal judges to require the release of arrestees without any bail if they cannot afford it, regardless of what the Constitution says or what such a sweeping abolition of money-bail requirements might portend. Indeed, for many individuals who are accused of a crime, facing months or years in jail, the temptation is great to skip court and avoid justice, and money bail can be a powerful incentive to check this temptation.

When judges set bail, they may obviously consider an arrestee’s ability to pay. But the Constitution does not require this to be the only factor. In fact, Texas law requires judges to consider not only an arrestee’s ability to pay but also their flight risk, criminal history, and danger to the community. Indigent arrestees who present little flight risk are frequently released without posting money bail. But public safety is not served by releasing, with no financial constraint, arrestees with long rap sheets and rich histories of failing to appear in court — which is what the Houston court’s decision arguably now requires.

Certainly the Constitution does not require the indiscriminate release of any arrestee, even for comparatively minor charges, on his or her own terms. The Eighth Amendment expressly protects arrestees from “excessive bail,” but federal courts have repeatedly and squarely held, in the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit — which has jurisdiction over the federal courts in Texas — that bail “is not constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy the requirement.”

Because they cannot prevail under the Eighth Amendment’s specific protection against excessive bail, the plaintiffs in ODonnell attempted to find a right to affordable bail in the Fourteenth Amendment’s more general “equal protection” and “due process” guarantees. But the Supreme Court has held that courts cannot sidestep an enumerated constitutional limitation on government power (here, the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “excessive bail”) by discovering an even more robust limitation on that power in the vaguer language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Otherwise, litigants could do just what the plaintiffs seek to do in the bail cases: Replace the Constitution’s standard for excessive bail with their own preferred standard.

This is not the only problem with the plaintiffs’ argument. Their claim boils down to the idea that facially neutral bail systems have a disparate impact on indigents, but the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis (1976) that disparate-impact claims are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to certain federal statutes that allow for such claims. Indeed, every law, at some level, has a disparate impact. In fact, in attempting to eliminate an alleged disparate impact on the indigent, the Houston court’s order creates express discrimination: Those who claim they are indigent may be released without providing any sureties, while those who are not indigent may be required to provide secured money bail or sit in jail. The Supreme Court has rejected such invidious reverse discrimination. And in ordering Houston to release prisoners, the district court also ignored the Supreme Court’s admonition that federal courts cannot use civil-rights lawsuits to order the release of arrestees.

The plaintiffs’ case rests largely on the policy argument, set forth by a few academics, that arrestees who are held in jail because they cannot make bail are more likely to plead guilty or commit crimes than those who are released on bail. But a recent study in Dallas found that failure-to-appear rates are, indeed, lower among misdemeanor arrestees released on secured bail those of arrestees released without a secured money requirement. This study confirms the elementary notion, obvious to anyone who has taken out a secured loan, that people are more likely to make good on a promise if they commit to forfeit something of value in the event that they renege.

More important, if opponents of money bail object to the time-tested bail system on policy grounds, or because of the latest academic study, they are free to try to convince their neighbors to abandon money bail by democratic choice, at the ballot box. The courts simply are not the correct forum to effect such changes.

— David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey practice constitutional and appellate law in Washington, D.C.

Source: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448115/odonnell-v-harris-county-excessive-bail-constitution-distorted

The Fourth Circuit Joins the ‘Resistance’

Another court has weighed in against President Trump’s executive order temporarily limiting entry to the U.S. of aliens from six terrorist hotspot countries in Africa and the Middle East. In ruling against the order last week, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals defied Supreme Court precedent and engaged the judicial branch in areas of policy that the Constitution plainly reserves to the president and Congress. The high court should reverse the decision.

In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a Maryland district judge’s nationwide injunction halting enforcement of the president’s order. Chief Judge Roger Gregory, writing for the 10-3 majority, acknowledged that the “stated national security interest is, on its face, a valid reason” for the order. But he went on to conclude that the administration acted in bad faith based on, among other things, “then-candidate Trump’s numerous campaign statements expressing animus towards the Islamic faith.”

Whatever one may think of that conclusion as a political matter, as a legal matter the judges overstepped their bounds. The controlling case is Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), in which the Supreme Court rejected a petition from American scholars seeking admission to the country on behalf of a foreign colleague who had been kept out because he advocated communism. The plaintiffs argued that the government’s refusal to admit their colleague on account of his views violated their First Amendment rights. The justices upheld his exclusion and made three things clear: first, aliens have no constitutional right to enter the U.S.; second, American citizens have no constitutional right to demand entry for aliens; and third, the decision to deny admission to an alien must be upheld if it is based on “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.”

 The high court has repeatedly reaffirmed and followed Mandel. Fiallo v. Bell (1977) rejected a challenge to immigration preferences that openly favored legitimate over illegitimate children and female U.S. nationals over male—distinctions that almost certainly would have been found unconstitutional in a domestic-policy context. In Kerry v. Din (2015), the justices upheld visa denial for the complainant’s husband, who had been a member of the Taliban. When the executive branch makes a decision “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, quoting Mandel, the judiciary can “ ‘neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against’ the constitutional interests of the citizens the visa denial might implicate.”

In holding that Mr. Trump acted in bad faith, the Fourth Circuit fundamentally misconstrued Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din,which nowhere suggested that, once the government had articulated a facially legitimate purpose, the courts could weigh whether there might have been an additional, improper purpose. As the Fourth Circuit dissenters explained, Mandel requires only a facially legitimate and facially bona fide reason.

Any other standard would constitute an invitation to the judiciary to direct the nation’s foreign and defense policies. Having misapplied Din, the Fourth Circuit went on to apply a standard domestic case-law analysis, under which the existence of a discriminatory purpose essentially dooms the exercise of governmental authority irrespective of other justifications. Under that approach, the government would have lost in Mandel, Fiallo and Din.

If the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning were to stand, it could cripple the president’s ability to defend the country. The judges claim Mr. Trump’s campaign statements, supposedly hostile to Islam rather than Islamist terror, transform his order into an “establishment” of religion in violation of the First Amendment. If the president is forbidden to impose temporary limitations on immigration from any Muslim-majority nations, it would follow that he is prohibited from taking any hostile or unfavorable actions, including the use of economic sanctions or military force, toward any Muslim-majority nation.

Making foreign policy is not the judiciary’s job, and the court’s decision in this case is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s admonition in Mandel that courts may not review the president’s exercise of discretion on foreign affairs—or balance it against asserted constitutional interests—once a facially legitimate and bona fide reason has been articulated. Further, the executive order is clearly authorized by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act. As Justice Robert Jackson famously observed in Youngstown v. Sawyer (1952), the president’s authority is most formidable when he is acting with Congress’s consent.

It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Fourth Circuit and the other courts that have stayed Mr. Trump’s executive orders on immigration are engaged in the judicial equivalent of the “resistance” to his presidency. Judges are, in effect, punishing the American electorate for having chosen the wrong president. That is not the judiciary’s role. Every federal judge has an obligation to accept the limitations imposed by the Constitution on his power—to exercise “neither force nor will, but merely judgment,” as Hamilton put it in Federalist No. 78.

The government is likely to seek an emergency Supreme Court stay of the Fourth Circuit’s decision. That may be difficult, because it requires a showing of “irreparable harm.” But even without a stay, there is little doubt the Supreme Court will remain faithful to its precedents and reverse the Fourth Circuit’s wrongheaded decision.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fourth-circuit-joins-the-resistance-1496071859