Tag Archives: constitution

A Champion of Constitutional Safeguards

Days before President Trump announced his choice of Judge Brett Kavanaugh for the Supreme Court, Senate Democrats had vowed to oppose any nominee. Backed by an activist-fueled propaganda machine, they now will unleash relentless personal attacks—on Judge Kavanaugh’s Catholic faith, his “elitist” Yale degrees, his service in the George W. Bush administration.

As with the attacks last year on Justice Neil Gorsuch, they should be unavailing. Over Judge Kavanaugh’s 12 years on the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, he has developed an impressive record as a legal thinker and a champion of the Constitution’s structural safeguards against overweening government.

Typical is a 2008 dissent in which Judge Kavanaugh concluded that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board was unconstitutionally structured because it improperly insulated the agency from political accountability. The opinion was a tour de force of historical exposition and originalist methodology—that is, interpreting the Constitution’s text as it was originally understood. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed, adopting the reasoning of Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.

Yet he is equally wary of unbridled executive authority, as a 2013 case shows. When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to proceed with licensing the proposed waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev., which the agency appeared to oppose on policy grounds, he wrote: “The President may not decline to follow a statutory mandate or prohibition simply because of policy objections.”

In articles and speeches as well as formal opinions, Judge Kavanaugh has been a leading critic of Chevron deference, the courts’ practice of giving agencies free rein to interpret their own statutory authority. In a 2016 law-review article, he wrote that Chevron encourages the executive branch “to be extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and restraints,” cutting Congress out of the picture. “The American rule of law, as I see it, depends on neutral, impartial judges who say what the law is.”

On that score, Judge Kavanaugh rivals the late Justice Antonin Scalia in his ability to make sense of Congress’s often knotty statutory constructions. Judge Kavanaugh considers textualism to be an important restraint on judges that prevents them from imposing their policy preferences. As he put it in that 2016 article: “When courts apply doctrines that allow them to rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power.”

That’s why the Democrats’ formulaic charges of partisanship won’t stick. In case after case, Judge Kavanaugh sided with the Obama administration in the war on terror. He turned away a constitutional challenge to ObamaCare on jurisdictional grounds, while writing that the government’s defenses of the law were “unprecedented” and without “principled limit.”

Across three successive administrations, Judge Kavanaugh has frequently ruled against the government. According to Jennifer Mascott of Scalia Law School, he “has written 40 opinions finding agency action to be unlawful and joined majority opinions reversing agency action in at least 35 additional cases.” That’s a muscular record on a court often criticized for deference to government.

Democrats may make an issue of a 1998 academic article in which Judge Kavanaugh—who early in his career worked in the Office of Independent Counsel during the Clinton administration—questioned whether the Constitution permits criminal prosecution of a sitting president. He didn’t actually reach a conclusion on the question, but the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel did, holding that a sitting president cannot be indicted. Since that opinion is binding on special counsel Robert Mueller, there’s no prospect the issue will reach the Supreme Court.

Democrats will also roll out culture-war issues like abortion and same-sex marriage. There is nothing in Judge Kavanaugh’s judicial or scholarly record to indicate how he would vote on any of those issues. Only one sitting justice, Clarence Thomas, has said he favors overturning Roe v. Wade, so the status quo on abortion seems likely to prevail for some time. As for same-sex marriage, there appears to be little appetite on the court to revisit it, and even less reason to believe that a case doing so is likely to arise, given its rapid public acceptance.

At any rate, it would be improper for Judge Kavanaugh to answer senators’ questions about how he would vote on any particular issue. Since Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s appointment in 1993, her “Ginsburg Rule”—“no hints, no forecasts, no previews”—has stood. Judges do not decide abstract issues but concrete cases with specific facts, arguments, and governing law. Judges have a duty to decide cases as they arise, without prejudgment. Like Justice Ginsburg, Judge Kavanaugh can and should be questioned on his record. And a fine record it is.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. Mr. Rivkin served at the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office. Mr. Grossman is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-champion-of-constitutional-safeguards-1531189515

 

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Trump has the Constitution on his side

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

June 12, 2018 in the Washington Post

The Constitution vests all executive power in the president. He has the authority to determine what matters will, and will not, be investigated and prosecuted by the U.S. government. This is also a core part of the president’s obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” — and it remains so even if done through an unorthodox channel such as Twitter.

So it is puzzling to see so much criticism of President Trump’s demand that the Justice Department investigate allegations about his presidential campaign being improperly subjected to an FBI counterintelligence probe. Same goes for his instruction to the Justice Department and the FBI that they should grant congressional requests for information about that matter.

Indeed, Trump would have been well within his authority, and well within precedent, to order an investigation entirely independent of the Justice Department and the FBI, as President Lyndon B. Johnson did when he created, by executive order, the Warren Commission to investigate the circumstances of President John F. Kennedy’s death.

When critics claim that a president cannot direct federal law-enforcement activities, they are implying that subordinate executive-branch officials can both judge and act upon their own assessment of a president’s motivations. There is no basis in the Constitution’s language, statute or Supreme Court precedent for such a notion. Those who object to a president’s instructions may resign, but they cannot usurp executive authority and defy him.

Imagine a world where this kind of insulation from presidential control existed. Such a system would create more opportunities for misconduct than the constitutionally enshrined system. Unlike appointed officials and employees, the president is accountable to the electorate. If he misuses his power, the voters can punish him. And if he abuses his authority, Congress can remove him from office through impeachment proceedings. By contrast, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was, for all practical purposes, insulated from presidential control, his tenure lasted decades and encompassed law-enforcement abuses and civil rights violations.

Only in one post-Watergate statute did Congress limit the president’s ability to oversee criminal investigations by providing for appointment of an independent counsel who could be removed only for cause. The Supreme Court upheld this law in Morrison v. Olson, even though it trenched upon the president’s executive authority, concluding that the statute did not unduly limit the president’s power because the imposition was slight. Effectively treating all federal prosecutors as independent and placing the entire federal law-enforcement apparatus beyond the president’s supervision would fly in the face of Morrison.

Besides, with accountability being a paramount constitutional virtue, there is another fundamental constitutional problem with the kind of insulation that Trump’s critics propose. Congressionally mandated insulation of independent counsels at least left Congress politically accountable.

By contrast, bureaucratic self-­insulation is inherently imprecise and destroys accountability. And unlike the statutorily based insulation that the Supreme Court reviewed in Morrison, self-insulation evades judicial review. This is anathema to our constitutional architecture and the rule of law.

Similarly, the Justice Department’s assertion of executive privilege to shield from disclosure documents — such as those sought by Congress on federal surveillance of the Trump campaign — is also a core presidential function. This power is grounded in the president’s right — as the head of a co-equal branch of government — to maintain his independence and do his job. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Nixon, in which White House tape recordings of the president’s own conversations were at issue, the “privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”

The court found, of course, that the privilege is not absolute. In Nixon and other cases, courts have required production of confidential executive materials. None has suggested, however, that a president’s voluntary decision to provide materials to Congress can be gainsaid, either by subordinate executive-branch officials or the courts. If the president determines to provide such materials to Congress, then the relevant agency officials must comply with his decision or resign. They have no legal authority to overrule such a presidential decision or to impose additional conditions on how Congress handles these materials.

This is true, though the documents being sought involve law-­enforcement materials. Indeed, as explained in a letter to Congress by Attorney General William French Smith in 1982, it has been Justice Department policy since at least President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration not to withhold such documents if they may “contain evidence of criminal or unethical conduct by agency officials.” Thus, to the extent Justice Department officials now object to Trump’s orders to provide the materials Congress seeks regarding surveillance of his presidential campaign, those objections cannot be sustained even under the department’s own policies.

Whatever one feels about the wisdom of Trump’s directives, fidelity to the Constitution best protects our democracy in the long run.

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, who practice appellate and constitutional law in the District, served in the Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Rivkin also served in the White House counsel’s office in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Source: www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-trump-has-the-power-to-investigate-the-fbis-probe-of-his-campaign/2018/06/12/dfaf7f84-6e5a-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html

 

Unappointed ‘Judges’ Shouldn’t Be Trying Cases

FISA Abuses Are a Special Threat to Privacy and Due Process

By  David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

Feb. 26, 2018, in the Wall Street Journal

The House Democratic surveillance memo is out, and it should worry Americans who care about privacy and due process. The memo defends the conduct of the Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation in obtaining a series of warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to wiretap former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page.

The Democrats argue that Christopher Steele, the British former spy who compiled the Trump “dossier” on which the government’s initial warrant application was grounded, was credible. They also claim the FISA court had the information it needed about the dossier’s provenance. And they do not dispute former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe’s acknowledgment that the FBI would not have sought a FISA order without the Steele dossier.

The most troubling issue is that the surveillance orders were obtained by withholding critical information about Mr. Steele from the FISA court. The court was not informed that Mr. Steele was personally opposed to Mr. Trump’s election, that his efforts were funded by Hillary Clinton’s campaign, or that he was the source of media reports that the FBI said corroborated his dossier. These facts are essential to any judicial assessment of Mr. Steele’s veracity and the applications’ merits.

The FBI should have been especially wary of privately produced Russia-related dossiers. As the Washington Post and CNN reported in May 2017, Russian disinformation about Mrs. Clinton and Attorney General Loretta Lynch evidently prompted former FBI Director James Comey to announce publicly the close of the investigation of the Clinton email server, for fear that the disinformation might be released and undermine the bureau’s credibility.

In addition, even assuming the dossier was accurate regarding Mr. Page, its allegations are thin. Mr. Page was said to have met in Moscow with Russian officials, who raised the potential for cooperation if Trump was elected; Mr. Page was noncommittal. The most significant claim—that those officials offered Mr. Page a bribe in the form of Russian business opportunities—suggests he was not a Russian agent. Existing operatives don’t need to be bribed.

There was no good reason to withhold from the FISA court any information regarding Mr. Steele, his anti-Trump biases, or the dossier’s origin as opposition research. The court operates in secret, so there was no danger of revealing intelligence sources and methods. The inescapable conclusion is that the information was withheld because the court would have been unlikely to issue the order if it knew the whole truth.

That’s a problem because following the rules and being absolutely candid with the court is even more essential in the FISA context than in ordinary criminal investigations. Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to create a judicial process through which counterintelligence surveillance could take place within the U.S., even when directed at American citizens, consistent with “this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.”

Because the purpose of counterintelligence is to gather information, not necessarily to prosecute criminals, the standards required for issuance of a FISA order are less demanding than those governing warrant requests in criminal cases. In both contexts a finding of “probable cause” is required. But an application for a criminal warrant must show, among other things, that “there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense” under federal law. Under FISA, it’s enough to show probable cause that the targeted U.S. person’s “activities may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States” (emphasis ours).

This difference is subtle but crucial. The FISA standard is far easier to meet; and in the past, the FISA court has criticized the government for taking advantage of the lower standard to obtain FISA warrants for use in criminal investigations. The lower standard makes it imperative that the responsible officials be extra careful when validating the information on which the order is based, in ensuring that the statutory standards are met, and in keeping the FISA court fully informed.

Slipshod and duplicitous FISA order applications also necessarily raise constitutional issues. FISA has been generally considered permissible under the Fourth Amendment, even though its probable-cause standard is “more flexible,” as one court noted, because of the statute’s procedural safeguards. But those protections mean very little if investigators withhold material information from the court. Moreover, in an ordinary criminal case, the target of surveillance has full due-process rights in a public trial. If a FISA order is obtained improperly, the target’s privacy is still invaded, but there is no opportunity for vindication. The perpetrators of the abuse, and even the abuse itself, will likely never be exposed.

Congress must consider carefully the actions of the FBI and Justice Department, with a determination to hold the responsible parties to account and to ask whether these abuses, which nearly went undetected, demand significant changes to the FISA process itself to protect the privacy and due-process rights of Americans.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s Office and Justice Department in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/fisa-abuses-are-a-special-threat-to-privacy-and-due-process-1519689446

Mark Janus Was With Hillary, Whether or Not He Wanted to Be

Flash back to the Las Vegas Convention Center, July 19, 2016. The floor overflows with people chanting, “We’re with her!” A speaker proclaims, to cheers and applause, that we “will stand with her in every corner of this nation.” Then Hillary Clinton takes the stage as the crowd rises in a standing ovation. She thanks them for supporting her campaign and rallies them to knock on doors and get out the vote.

The event wasn’t organized by the campaign. It was the 2016 convention of the nation’s largest union representing public-sector workers, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The state of Illinois forced Mark Janus —an Illinois employee who refused to join the union—to pay for a portion that pro-Hillary rally.

Across the U.S., more than 500,000 state and local workers have objected to funding union advocacy but are nonetheless required by law to pay “fair share” fees to labor unions they have refused to join. The Supreme Court upheld the practice in a 1977 case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, reasoning that otherwise workers could “free ride” on the union’s collective bargaining. Prohibiting unions from charging nonmembers directly for political speech, it believed, would protect their First Amendment rights.

On Monday the justices will hear oral arguments in a challenge to that 1977 decision brought by Mr. Janus. They should heed Justice Felix Frankfurter’s observation, in an earlier case on mandatory union fees, that it is “rather naive” to assume “that economic and political concerns are separable.” As Mr. Janus argues, bargaining over wages, pensions and benefits in the public sector involves issues of intense public concern and thus core First Amendment-protected speech. A state law that forces public employees to fund that speech violates their rights, no less than compelling them to speak. ( Janus v. Afscme doesn’t consider these questions for unions in the private sector.)

Other unions that held pro-Clinton rallies include the American Federation of Teachers, the National Education Association and the Service Employees International Union, which represents about one million public workers. The SEIU convention passed a resolution that the union will “elect Hillary Clinton” as president “by mobilizing millions of voters.” Unions and state governments maintain that nonmembers can be charged for these conventions because they are where the unions adopt bargaining strategies and representational policies.

Afscme used its convention to weigh in on practically every major political issue. One resolution condemned Senate Republicans and demanded hearings and a vote on Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court. Others addressed funding for public infrastructure, educational spending, paid family and sick leave, private contracting of government services, the minimum wage, and “right to work” laws, with each resolution taking the expected union position.

More surprising were resolutions with no obvious connection to union interests—demanding gun-control laws, statehood for the District of Columbia, marijuana legalization, “comprehensive immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship,” “racial justice” and an end to state laws that protect religious freedom. Whatever Mr. Janus’s positions on these issues, he was forced to fund Afscme’s advocacy on them.

The American Federation of Teachers has charged nonmembers for advocacy supporting public funding for Planned Parenthood, the “climate justice movement” and a constitutional amendment to restrict political speech by overturning Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission—which, ironically, protects union as well as corporate speech.

But the National Education Association takes the cake. Its current resolutions stake out positions on topics from the adoption of constitutional amendments through the convention process of the Constitution’s Article V (NEA is opposed), to American participation in the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court (thumbs up), to “covert operations and counterintelligence activities,” along with the “self-determination of indigenous people.” The NEA has spent objectors’ money on advocacy in favor of racial preferences, comprehensive sex education, restoration of voting rights for felons, and adoption of the metric system by the U.S.

Yes, the metric system.

These unions also charge nonmembers for training programs embodying the same political outlook. A recent AFT conference in Detroit featured sessions on participating in “the Resistance,” “fighting against Trump and [Education Secretary Betsy ] DeVos, ” and “organizing a sanctuary campus” to block participation in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The NEA, meanwhile, uses nonmembers’ fees to produce materials for teachers addressing “social justice” issues, such as “diversity,” “privilege,” and “hierarchies of oppression.”

These details reflect the basic truth that labor unions are political organizations. Everything they do, from massive political expenditures to bargaining activities, is shot through with political purpose and consideration. Under the First Amendment, they have the right to politic in all these ways—just as Mr. Janus has the right not to pay for it.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice constitutional and appellate law in Washington. Mr. Grossman filed a brief on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute supporting Mr. Janus.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-janus-was-with-hillary-whether-or-not-he-wanted-to-be-1519341922

Can a President obstruct Justice?

Speculation about Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation has turned toward obstruction of justice—specifically, whether President Trump can be criminally prosecuted for firing James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or for earlier asking Mr. Comey to go easy on onetime national security adviser Mike Flynn. The answer is no. The Constitution forbids Congress to criminalize such conduct by a president, and applying existing statutes in such a manner would violate the separation of powers.

The Constitution creates three coequal branches of government, and no branch may exercise its authority in a manner that would negate or fundamentally undercut the power of another. The power to appoint and remove high-level executive-branch officers, such as the FBI director, is a core aspect of the president’s executive authority. It is the principal means by which a president disciplines the exercise of the executive power the Constitution vests in him.

The same is true of Mr. Trump’s request, as purported by Mr. Comey: “I hope you can see your way clear . . . to letting Flynn go.” The FBI director wields core presidential powers when conducting an investigation, and the president is entirely within his rights to inquire about, and to direct, such investigations. The director is free to ignore the president’s inquiries or directions and risk dismissal, or to resign if he believes the president is wrong. Such officials serve at the president’s pleasure and have no right to be free of such dilemmas.

A law criminalizing the president’s removal of an officer for a nefarious motive, or the application of a general law in that way, would be unconstitutional even if the president’s action interferes with a criminal investigation. Such a constraint would subject every exercise of presidential discretion to congressional sanction and judicial review. That would vitiate the executive branch’s coequal status and, when combined with Congress’s impeachment power, establish legislative supremacy—a result the Framers particularly feared.

Mr. Trump’s critics claim that subjecting the president’s actions to scrutiny as potential obstructions of justice is simply a matter of asking judges to do what they do every day in other contexts—determine the purpose or intent behind an action. That is also wrong. The president is not only an individual, but head of the executive branch. Separating his motives between public interests and personal ones—partisan, financial or otherwise—would require the courts to delve into matters that are inherently political. Under Supreme Court precedent stretching back to Marbury v. Madison (1803), the judiciary has no power to do so. And lawmakers enjoy an analogous immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause.

The president’s independence from the other branches does not merely support “energy” in the chief executive, as the Framers intended. It also ensures that he, and he alone, is politically accountable for his subordinates’ conduct. If officials as critical to the executive branch’s core functions as the FBI director could determine whom and how to investigate free from presidential supervision, they would wield the most awesome powers of government with no political accountability. History has demonstrated that even when subject to presidential authority, the FBI director can become a power unto himself—as J. Edgar Hoover was for decades, severely damaging civil liberties.

There are limits to presidential power. The Constitution requires the Senate’s consent for appointment of the highest-level executive-branch officers—a critical check on presidential power. The Supreme Court has upheld statutory limits—although never involving criminal sanction—on the removal of certain kinds of officials. But the decision to fire principal executive-branch officers like the FBI director remains within the president’s discretion. A sitting president can also be subjected to civil lawsuits—but only in a carefully circumscribed fashion, to avoid impeding his ability to discharge the powers of his office.

The ultimate check on presidential power is impeachment. Even though Mr. Trump cannot have violated criminal law in dismissing Mr. Comey, if a majority of representatives believe he acted improperly or corruptly, they are free to impeach him. If two-thirds of senators agree, they can remove him from office. Congress would then be politically accountable for its action. Such is the genius of our Constitution’s checks and balances.

None of this is to suggest the president has absolute immunity from criminal obstruction-of-justice laws. He simply cannot be prosecuted for an otherwise lawful exercise of his constitutional powers. The cases of Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton —the latter impeached, and the former nearly so, for obstruction of justice—have contributed to today’s confusion. These were not criminal charges but articulations of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” the constitutional standard for impeachment.

And in neither case was the accusation based on the president’s exercise of his lawful constitutional powers. If a president authorizes the bribery of a witness to suppress truthful testimony, as Nixon was accused of doing, he can be said to have obstructed justice. Likewise if a president asks a potential witness to commit perjury in a judicial action having nothing to do with the exercise of his office, as Mr. Clinton was accused of doing.

Although neither man could have been prosecuted while in office without his consent, either could have been after leaving office. That’s why President Ford pardoned Nixon—to avoid the spectacle and poisonous political atmosphere of a criminal trial. In Mr. Trump’s case, by contrast, the president exercised the power to fire an executive-branch official whom he may dismiss for any reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all. To construe that as a crime would unravel America’s entire constitutional structure.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s office and Justice Department in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-president-obstruct-justice-1512938781

Begging Your Pardon, Mr. President

The Trump presidency has been consumed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s efforts to uncover collusion between the Trump campaign and Moscow. Mr. Mueller reportedly has secured one or more indictments that he will announce Monday. Some Republicans now seek a new special counsel to investigate if the Clinton Campaign “colluded” with Russians to smear Candidate Trump, along with other aspects of the Clintons’ relationship with Russia and Russian nationals. But one special counsel already is one too many.

During the 1980s and ’90s, American politics was repeatedly distorted, and lives devastated, through the appointment of independent counsels under the post-Watergate Ethics in Government Act. These constitutionally anomalous prosecutors were given unlimited time and resources to investigate officials, including President Clinton, and scandals, such as Iran-Contra. Once appointed, almost all independent counsels built little Justice Departments of their own and set out to find something—anything—to prosecute. Hardly anyone lamented the expiration of this pernicious law in 1999.
But special counsels, appointed by the attorney general and in theory subject to Justice Department oversight, haven’t proved any better in practice. Mr. Mueller’s investigation has already morphed into an open-ended inquiry. It is examining issues—like Donald Trump’s private business transactions—that are far removed from the Russian question. It also has expanded its focus beyond the original question of collusion with the Russians to whether anyone involved in the Russia investigation has committed some related offense. That is evident from investigators’ efforts to interview White House aides who were not involved in the 2016 campaign, and from leaks suggesting that Mr. Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey might have “obstructed” justice.

That claim is frivolous, and it damages America’s constitutional fabric even to consider it. A president cannot obstruct justice through the exercise of his constitutional and discretionary authority over executive-branch officials like Mr. Comey. If a president can be held to account for “obstruction of justice” by ending an investigation or firing a prosecutor or law-enforcement official—an authority the constitution vests in him as chief executive—then one of the presidency’s most formidable powers is transferred from an elected, accountable official to unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats and judges.

Mr. Mueller’s investigation has been widely interpreted as partisan from the start. Mr. Trump’s opponents instantaneously started talking of impeachment—never mind that a special counsel, unlike an independent counsel, has no authority to release a report to Congress or the public. Mr. Trump’s supporters count the number of Democratic donors on the special-counsel staff. The Mueller investigation is fostering tremendous bitterness among Trump voters, who see it as an effort by Washington mandarins to nullify their votes.

Mr. Trump can end this madness by immediately issuing a blanket presidential pardon to anyone involved in supposed collusion with Russia or Russians during the 2016 presidential campaign, to anyone involved with Russian acquisition of an American uranium company during the Obama administration, and to anyone for any offense that has been investigated by Mr. Mueller’s office. Political weaponization of criminal law should give way to a politically accountable democratic process. Nefarious Russian activities, including possible interference in U.S. elections, can and should be investigated by Congress.

Partisan bitterness will not evaporate if lawmakers take up the investigation. But at least those conducting the inquiry will be legitimate and politically accountable. And the question of whether Russia intervened in the 2016 election, and of whether it made efforts to influence U.S. policy makers in previous administrations, is first and foremost one of policy and national security, not criminal law.

The president himself would be covered by the blanket pardon we recommend, but the pardon power does not extend to impeachment. If Congress finds evidence that he was somehow involved in collusion with Russia, the House can determine whether to begin impeachment proceedings. Congress also is better equipped, as part of its oversight role, to determine whether and how the FBI, Justice Department and intelligence agencies might have been involved in the whole affair, including possible misuse of surveillance and mishandling of criminal investigations.

There is ample precedent for using the presidential pardon authority to address matters of political importance. Certainly it is what the framers expected. As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 69, the pardon power was to “resemble . . . that of the king of Great Britain.” In Federalist 74, he observed that “there are often critical moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to . . . insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth.”

Securing harmony in the body politic was President Washington’s motivation when he offered amnesty to participants in the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s, and it was President Lincoln’s motivation when he issued an amnesty during the Civil War for Confederates who would return their allegiance to the Union. Similar reasons motivated President Ford to pardon Richard Nixon, and President Carter when he offered amnesty to Vietnam-era draft evaders.

Lincoln’s proclamation of Dec. 8, 1863, is an excellent model of a broadly drafted and complete amnesty: “I . . . do proclaim, declare and make known to all persons who have directly or by implication participated in the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a full pardon is granted to them . . . upon condition that every such person shall take and subscribe an oath” of loyalty to the U.S. A similar pardon can be issued with respect to the Russian affair, ending the criminal investigations and leaving the business to Congress.

Permitting the criminal law again to become a regular weapon in politics is more destructive of democratic government than ham-handed efforts by a foreign power to embarrass one or more presidential candidates. It is true that Washington’s Augean stables need periodic cleaning, but it is Congress that should wield the shovels.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s office and Justice Department in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/begging-your-pardon-mr-president-1509302308