Tag Archives: David Rivkin

The Judicial ‘Resistance’ Is Futile

The U.S. Supreme Court does not act in haste, so the justices raised some eyebrows last month when they took only two weeks to agree to hear the government’s appeal of an immigration case. Normally it would have taken several months, and a ruling might not have come until 2019. Instead the court is expected to issue a decision in Trump v. Hawaii by the end of the current term, in June.

Why the rush? Because lower-court judges have been playing an extraordinary cat-and-mouse game with the Supreme Court over President Trump’s three executive orders limiting immigration from several terror-prone countries. Over the past year, numerous trial and appellate courts have enjoined those orders, only to have the high court stay their decisions.

The lower-court judges have defied precedent by holding that the president has neither constitutional nor statutory authority to issue these orders. They have improperly questioned Mr. Trump’s motives, even analyzing his campaign statements for evidence of bad intent. And they have responded to each reversal from the high court by spinning new theories to strike down the orders. The judges appear to have joined the “resistance,” and it wouldn’t be surprising if the justices concluded enough is enough.

The case the court will now review is the handiwork of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which engaged in an analysis that ignored key precedents and misapplied accepted canons of statutory interpretation.

Any legal analysis of the travel orders must begin with the core constitutional propositions, articulated by the Supreme Court in Knauff v. Shaughnessy (1950), that “an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right” and that the authority to exclude aliens “stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.” Congress has the leading role in determining who may immigrate, stay and become a citizen. But the president has independent plenary authority to exclude aliens for foreign-policy or national-security reasons.

The Ninth Circuit brushed aside Knauff and held that Mr. Trump “lacks independent constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation, as control over the entry of aliens is a power within the exclusive province of Congress.” Then it went a step beyond that.

In 1952 Congress enacted a statute authorizing the president to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whenever he finds their entry to be “detrimental” to the national interest and to establish restrictions on entry. The Ninth Circuit declared that the law as written amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power—never mind that in Knauff the high court dismissed such a challenge to a similar statute, holding that Congress had merely reaffirmed the president’s own constitutional authority.

The Ninth Circuit further argued that even if the statutory language was constitutional, it was outweighed by a provision in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act barring discrimination on the basis of nationality. But that provision applies to the issuance of immigrant visas, not the entry of aliens. Holding that a statute dealing with one issue vitiates a statute dealing with another matter is not, to put it mildly, an accepted statutory interpretation method.

The circuit judges still weren’t done. They held that even if the 1952 statute applied, Mr. Trump failed to comply with it. The judges characterized his proclamation as reflecting “general immigration concerns” not grounded in critical foreign-policy or national-security findings. In fact, the order clearly stated the action or inaction of the eight designated governments made it impossible to assess adequately whether admission of their nationals creates an unacceptable risk to the U.S.

That was an especially egregious error. The Constitution and Supreme Court cases going back to the seminal Marbury v. Madison (1803) grant the courts no authority to review the discretionary policy choices made by the political branches. When it comes to immigration, the judiciary’s role is limited to determining whether any procedural requirements Congress had enacted have been satisfied. That is what the Supreme Court did in Knauff and what the Ninth Circuit should have done here.

The Supreme Court seems likely to correct this error. The justices voted 7-2 in December to stay any judicial order stopping implementation of the current immigration policy, even before the Ninth Circuit’s decision was issued. One hopes the justices will strongly affirm that the president has the power to exclude aliens from the U.S. for foreign-policy and national-security purposes, and that the judiciary has no role in reviewing his policy choices in this area. A unanimous ruling would send an especially strong message.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington. They served in the White House Counsel’s Office and Justice Department in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://t.co/CTxCOOSJ8F


The Zero That Makes Mulvaney a Hero

By Democrats’ design, the CFPB director has vast power. He can use it to shrink the bureau.

Richard Cordray asked Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen for $217 million in October—his last such request as director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Last week Mr. Cordray’s acting successor, Mick Mulvaney, made his first quarterly funding request: “$0.” What a difference a few months make.

Established in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis according to now-Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s vision, the CFPB ran wild under Mr. Cordray’s leadership—issuing reams of punishing regulations and conducting endless fishing expeditions, sometimes into industries Congress had specifically excluded from its jurisdiction.

This was possible because the bureau was designed to be insulated from accountability. It is led by a single director, whom the president cannot fire except for cause, and funded by the Fed, so that it need not justify its actions and funding needs to Congress.

Whether this arrangement is constitutional is an open question, currently pending in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. But for now, as that court’s Judge Brett Kavanaugh has observed, it renders the CFPB director “the single most powerful official in the entire United States Government” (with the possible exception of the president).

That power now belongs to Mr. Mulvaney—and if Mr. Cordray had no constraints in his overreach, his successor is equally free to rein it in. Mr. Mulvaney has already frozen new regulations as well as regulatory “guidance,” which agencies often treat as carrying the force of law. But with Mr. Cordray’s minions burrowed into the bureau’s 1,600-person workforce, tweaks to rules and enforcement policies will only go so far.

The linchpin for fast and effective deregulation is substantially defunding the agency and clearing out its ranks in the process. Mr. Mulvaney’s request of zip from Ms. Yellen is a good first step.

The statute creating the bureau sets its budget at “the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau,” and no one is authorized to second-guess that determination. That supports Mr. Mulvaney’s decision to forgo additional funding this quarter and draw down the unauthorized $177 million “reserve fund” Mr. Cordray built up during his tenure.

The language that authorizes Mr. Mulvaney to slash funding applies equally to spending—after all, determining what is “reasonably necessary” to do the bureau’s business implies determining what that business is. When Congress has made a lump-sum appropriation to an agency without mandates for spending on particular items, the courts have viewed that as authorization for the agency to choose how to spend the funds. The CFPB’s funding mechanism confers even broader discretion on the director given that he controls revenue as well.

It is possible that a court would require funding for the CFPB’s statutory obligations. The statute requires, for example, that the bureau establish an office focused on “traditionally underserved consumers and communities.” That mandate suggests that the director cannot zero out the office’s budget. But it says nothing about how much funding is required or whether assistance to underserved communities is best organized at the state level, with a skeleton crew at the CFPB playing a coordinating role. There is no standard by which a court could review those decisions.

The bottom line is that all of the CFPB’s discretionary spending is at the pleasure of the director, and the bulk of its $630 million budget is discretionary. That gives Mr. Mulvaney the power to reshape the agency radically—and resize it—in short order. And by exerting his powers to their fullest, perhaps Mr. Mulvaney will be able to convince even congressional Democrats that those powers are excessive and ought to be restrained.

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-zero-that-makes-mulvaney-a-hero-1516566319

The Iran Deal Violates U.S. Law

Obama let Tehran get into the medical-isotope business, contrary to the intent of Congress.

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and James L. Connaughton

Oct. 12, 2017, in the Wall Street Journal

As President Trump decides whether to certify his predecessor’s nuclear deal with Iran, here’s another wrinkle he should keep in mind: The deal’s implementation violates federal law, namely the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012.

That statute seeks to end the nuclear-proliferation risk associated with foreign production of radioactive substances for medical use using weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. U.S. doctors use a molybdenum isotope, moly-99, in 20 million procedures annually to detect early cancer, heart disease and other lethal illnesses. But the U.S. has no domestic production capability, relying instead on foreign suppliers who obtain the necessary highly enriched uranium from the U.S. government.

In enacting the 2012 law, Congress sought to end exports of highly enriched uranium while ramping up sufficient domestic production of moly-99 to satisfy U.S. needs. Since America uses roughly half of the world’s moly-99, robust U.S. production would cramp the ability of foreign isotope suppliers to control the market and sell their wares globally.

Under the 2012 law, the National Nuclear Security Administration is supposed to implement programs to encourage U.S. entrepreneurs to develop ways of making moly-99 without using highly enriched uranium, with the goal of making enough of it to justify permanently ending U.S. exports of highly enriched uranium. The Obama administration conspicuously failed to fulfill the law’s requirements. Moly-99 is not being produced in the U.S. and the U.S. government continues to export weapons-grade uranium overseas.

The Iran deal makes matters worse. It specifically permits Tehran an unlimited right to generate highly enriched uranium for use in medical isotope production. Iran is free to join with other producers to control supply and price. Earlier this year Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s former lead nuclear negotiator and now head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, declared Iran’s intention to become a major supplier of medical isotopes. Most significantly, the Iran deal’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commits the U.S. and other parties to assist Iranian medical isotope development with technology transfer, project finance, export credits and other forms of investment. The European Union has established a joint nuclear cooperation working group with Iran.

The U.S. cannot in good faith implement these obligations without evading its obligation under the American Medical Isotopes Production Act to curtail such foreign medical isotope production. Under U.S. law, there is no question which obligation prevails. The Obama administration, knowing the Senate would never ratify the JCPOA as a treaty, made it an “executive agreement” instead. Such agreements can have the force of law, but under our Constitution the president cannot unilaterally repeal a statute. It’s another reason the administration should declare the Iran deal null and void.

Mr. Rivkin, a Washington-based constitutional lawyer, served at the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Mr. Connaughton served as chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, 2001-09.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-iran-deal-violates-u-s-law-1507847288

Is President Trump’s executive order constitutional?

February 6, 2017, in the Washington Post

Editor’s note: On Friday, U.S. District Judge James L. Robart issued a ruling temporarily halting enforcement of President Trump’s executive order barring entry to the U.S. for citizens of seven majority-Muslim countries. On Monday evening, David Rivkin and Karen Tumlin exchanged views and predictions about the legal fight over the executive order. The email discussion was moderated by Post Opinions digital editor James Downie and has been edited for style and clarity.

Karen Tumlin: Hi, James and David, looking forward to having this discussion with you both on this important topic.

The executive order has several legal problems. I would highlight two of the most serious. First, ours is a nation that was founded on the premise that individuals should be free from religious discrimination by the government. That principle is enshrined in our Constitution and prohibits the federal government from discriminating against or favoring any religious group. This executive order does both. By banning the entry of individuals with valid visas from seven majority-Muslim countries, there is no question that the executive order singles out Muslims for disfavored treatment. Equally questionable is the preference given to minority religions under the executive order for refugees. Practically, this favors the admission of Christians.

Second, in addition to this broad delegation of authority from Congress, the president has inherent, formidable constitutional authority of his own over foreign affairs and national security, with the power to control immigration being an integral part of those authorities. So, here we have two political branches that have spoken in unison on this issue, placing the president in the strongest possible legal position. Last but not least, well-established Supreme Court precedents indicate that states — like the states of Washington and Minnesota — have no equal-protection rights of their own, nor can they vindicate equal-protection rights of their citizens. The same is true about being able to challenge alleged religious discrimination. This limitation on the states’ authority to champion such claims is fundamental to our separation-of-powers architecture.

Tumlin: When looking at the legality of this executive order, we have to look back to the very clear, discriminatory intentions for the order that were laid down repeatedly on the campaign trail by then-candidate Trump to create a ban on the entry of Muslims to the United States. The text of the executive order serves to implement that shameful campaign promise, as do statements by the president and the drafters of the order since its signing. Our Constitution does not stand for this kind of governmental discrimination.

You don’t have to discriminate against every Muslim in the world to run afoul of our Constitution’s protections and human decency.

The executive order doesn’t make us safer as a country, it puts us more at risk. But don’t just take my word for it. Have a look at the declaration submitted Monday at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit by a host of national security ex-officials from both sides of the aisle noting that in their “professional opinion, this Order cannot be justified on national security or foreign policy grounds.”

Rivkin: I disagree. There are a few instances that arise in the unique context of domestic equal-protection challenges to governmental actions that are facially neutral but produce substantial discriminatory impacts on groups of people, based on such suspect classifications as race, nationality, ethnic origin, etc. This doctrine has never been used in foreign affairs, both because of the tremendous judicial deference owed in this area to the two political branches and because discerning the intentions of the president is particularly difficult in the national security area, given the inherent lack of judicial competence in foreign affairs and lack of access to classified information.

 And, as a practical matter, under your logic, courts would rule differently on the constitutionality of exactly the same executive orders, suspending entry of certain types of aliens — with Obama’s order delaying the entrance of refugees from Iraq and President Ronald Reagan’s suspending the entrance of certain Cuban nationals — depending on how they felt about the subjective intentions of a given president. This cannot possibly be true.

And, to reiterate, as far as the judgments regarding whether or not this order makes us safer, such judgments are uniquely unsuited for judicial discernment and the judiciary is barred from engaging on them on the basis of the Supreme Court’s case law, known as the political question doctrine. The fact that some former national security officials challenge the policy wisdom of the order, while other national security officials — most notably those of this administration — support it, merely demonstrates that these are policy disputes that the judiciary is both ill-equipped and constitutionally barred from arbitrating.

James Downie: Karen, how would you respond to the argument that the president has the authority to enact this order?

Tumlin: The president is not king. He, too, must abide by our Constitution as well as the immigration laws duly written and passed by Congress. What the president has done here is attempt to hastily legislate by executive fiat. The result has been confusion among federal officials unsure of how to interpret or implement this presidential dictate and very real human suffering. And let’s be clear, this executive order does not only target non-U.S. citizens living abroad. It has profound consequences on U.S. citizens who can’t bring their parents in to witness the birth of a child, or on businesses that can’t send their most talented U.S.-based executives abroad for important meetings. And the order has left others in limbo overseas who may have taken a trip abroad to, for example, visit an ill relative, and unless the Washington state decision stands will not be able to return to their families and jobs in the United States because their validly issued visa vanished overnight.

Downie: David, can you expand on the argument that it’s not discriminatory against Muslims? Ilya Somin elsewhere on The Post’s site writes, “The unconstitutional motive behind Trump’s order can’t be sidestepped by pointing out that it blocks some non-Muslim refugees too. Poll taxes and literacy tests excluded a good many poor whites from the franchise, but were still clearly aimed at blacks.” What are your thoughts on that?

 Rivkin: My argument is focused on the fact that a relatively small percentage of the world’s Muslim countries are impacted by this order. Stated differently, this executive order is a singularly ineffective — in legal parlance, it would be called under-inclusive — form of a Muslim ban. Accordingly, it is not a Muslim ban at all, but a suspension of entrants from seven countries with conditions on the ground that both promote terrorism and make effective vetting impossible. By contrast, poll taxes were very effective in excluding blacks, as well as impacting many poor whites; in legal parlance, they were overly inclusive but nevertheless served their intended discriminatory purpose. This is fundamentally not the case here.

Tumlin: I would humbly submit that a more relevant lens to look at this question is in terms of recent Muslim migration to the United States. For example, 82 percent of all Muslim refugees who entered the United States in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 hailed from the seven countries. The executive order may not use the words “Muslims keep out,” but it certainly would serve to achieve that goal if allowed to stand.

Downie: In closing, how do you expect the 9th Circuit to decide on Robart’s ruling?

Rivkin: I believe that the 9th Circuit will not let Robart’s decision stand. I say this fully appreciating the fact that the 9th Circuit is the most idiosyncratic in the country and the one most often overruled by the Supreme Court. However, given the fact that the case brought by the states is so deeply flawed — they fail both standing-wise and merits-wise — I believe that the 9th Circuit will do the right thing and will rule in a matter of days. I would also expect that, because the plaintiffs in this case lack standing, the 9th Circuit would not only overturn Robart’s temporary restraining order but would dismiss the entire case without ever reaching the merits. If I am wrong and the 9th Circuit fails to do this, I have every confidence that this would be the result reached by the Supreme Court, when it became seized of that case.

Tumlin: I respectfully disagree with David on this always risky judicial crystal ball-gazing. In the 10 days since the executive order was signed, we have seen people take to the streets all across this country to protest it, lawyers like me have taken to the courts to challenge its illegality, and a diverse and stunning cross-section of Americans from every walk of life have questioned its wisdom. All because this executive order stands in sharp contrast with our legal and moral principles as a nation. I have every confidence that the 9th Circuit will let this temporary block on this harmful executive order stand.

 It is also worth mentioning that a real question exists as to the propriety of the 9th Circuit weighing in on the district court’s order at all at this time. Generally, temporary restraining orders are not appealable immediately to the higher courts.

Rivkin: In our constitutional system, the extent of political controversies, including the protests, surrounding a given issue is utterly unrelated to the analysis of legality and should have no effect on any court. And whether or not this order is inconsistent with our moral and legal traditions is a classical hortatory declaration, suitable for political debates, and is not a viable legal argument.

David B. Rivkin Jr. practices appellate and constitutional law in the District and served in the Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Karen Tumlin is legal director for the National Immigration Law Center and the NILC Immigrant Justice Fund.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-president-trumps-executive-order-constitutional/2017/02/06/26ee9762-ecc1-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html

It’s unrealistic and unfair to make Trump use a blind trust

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

November 22, 2016, in the Washington Post

Suggestions that President-elect Donald Trump put his business holdings in a “blind trust” to avoid potential conflicts of interest are unrealistic and unfair. Such a trust would not eliminate the virtual certainty that actions Trump takes as president will affect his personal wealth, for good or ill. The step is not required by law. And presidents who have chosen to use this device held very different assets than Trump’s. He can keep his holdings and adopt a reasonable system to avoid conflicts and reassure the American people that the Trump administration is acting ethically.

To establish a blind trust of the sort used by his predecessors, Trump would not merely have to liquidate a securities portfolio and permit an independent trustee to manage those assets. He would have to sell off business holdings that he has built and managed most of his life, and with which he is personally identified in a way that few other business magnates are.

These businesses also provide employment for many thousands of people, including his children. All of it would have to go. This liquidation would by definition take place in the context of a “buyer’s market,” and so Trump would also be required to accept a vast personal loss in financial worth. Those suggesting the blind trust model must understand that their proposal is a poison pill Trump will not swallow.

Moreover, requiring Trump to liquidate his holdings would discourage other entrepreneurs from seeking the presidency, leaving the field clear for professional politicians and investors. Given that the American people have made clear their disgust with Washington’s elite, creating a disincentive for businesspeople to seek the presidency is not in the public interest.

Trump has suggested that he will let his adult children run the family businesses during his presidency, and there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents this arrangement. The emoluments clause, often invoked as the reason Trump must sell his businesses, is no bar. This constitutional provision prevents the president (and any other federal officer) from accepting gifts or compensation from foreign states. It does not limit Trump’s ability to benefit from dealings with non-state foreign entities. Whether a “state-controlled” entity falls within the emoluments clause prohibitions has traditionally been addressed on a case-by-case basis, depending principally on how independently such an entity operates from an actual government.

Likewise, neither federal law nor regulations limit the president in this area. Presidential candidates and presidents must disclose their finances, but the president is not covered by the principal financial conflict-of-interest law, and the relevant regulations specifically exclude the president. Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress could constitutionally limit the president’s personal investments or business activities consistent with separation of powers principles.

Of course, Trump’s wide holdings will likely raise real or perceived conflicts of interest during his presidency. Establishing a blind trust would have helped him address those concerns. There are, however, other measures that the president-elect can take to avoid conflicts. He can establish a firewall between himself and his adult children with respect to family business affairs. They would agree to give him no information about their business dealings, and he would pledge not to discuss those dealings with them.

In addition, his children could promise to refer any potential transactions involving foreign corporations or other entities to the White House counsel’s office or the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel to analyze whether it would raise concerns under the emoluments clause. If the answer is yes, then they will avoid that transaction. The president himself would not be informed of the request or determination.

Finally, to the extent he wishes to seek advice about public policy from his children — which he appears to have done frequently before his election — the president can consult the White House counsel’s office about whether discussing a particular issue with them would create potential conflicts of interest. Most government issues do not have a direct impact on the hospitality industry and simply taking action that is good for the economy as a whole would not give rise to a conflict.

It is clear that Trump cannot satisfy all of his critics, but these measures are both reasonable and workable. They would — or should — reassure most Americans that his administration is acting with probity.

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey, who practice appellate and constitutional law in the District, served in the Justice Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Rivkin also served in the White House counsel’s office in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-unrealistic-and-unfair-to-make-trump-use-a-blind-trust/2016/11/22/a71aa1d4-b0c0-11e6-8616-52b15787add0_story.html

Let the Electoral College Do Its Duty

September 7, 2016, in the Wall Street Journal

To those counting the days until Nov. 8 when the presidential election campaign will finally end, some bad news: The contest won’t truly be decided until the Electoral College’s vote on Dec. 19. Then again, this could be good news for Americans who still hope to escape the dilemma presented by the major parties’ nomination of two unpopular candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump—but only if the electors’ constitutionally guaranteed independence is observed in the face of state laws seeking to control their votes.

America’s method of presidential selection is as peculiar and clever as the federalism and separation-of-powers principles that fostered it. To guard against the passions of populism, the Framers interposed a college of state-based electors between voters and the actual presidential selection. To discourage political obligation and intrigue, they provided that the electors would meet just once, in their respective states, for the sole purpose of casting ballots for the next president and vice president.

And to prevent the presidency from being captured by regional interests, they required the winner to obtain a majority of the Electoral College votes. Failing that, the election is thrown to the House of Representatives, to choose among the top three vote-getters.

Today, the Electoral College vote is regarded as a nearly mechanical process: The parties nominate their slates, elector seats are awarded (in most states) to the popular vote winner’s party slate, and a few weeks later the electors certify what the people have already chosen.

In an unusual campaign year like this one, however, that may be too much to take for granted. Electors are typically party stalwarts, but many ideologically committed Democrats and Republicans lack enthusiasm for this year’s top-of-ticket candidates. Several would-be Republican electors are already publicly flirting with the idea of casting their votes for someone other than Mr. Trump, believing that his erratic outbursts have “disqualified” him from being president.

Right or wrong, that is exactly the kind of discernment that the Constitution demands electors exercise. It was their duty, Alexander Hamilton explained, to ensure that “the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”

Instead, representing the interests of their states and constituents, the electors would vote only for those possessing “the esteem and confidence of the whole Union” sufficient to win the requisite majority vote, thereby providing “a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.” If the parties have failed in that task, then it falls to the electors to provide a final check.

Elector independence is also a practical necessity. Federal law provides no other means to respond to the death or incapacitation of the popular vote-winner after Election Day but before the Electoral College votes. Likewise, death or disability shortly before Election Day may present the same quandary, given state-law delays in altering ballots. And should electors blind themselves to revelations of corruption or foreign control that might emerge in the weeks before they meet? To deal with all of these contingencies, the Framers’ intention was that electors would exercise their discretion and judgment.

As a matter of original constitutional meaning, elector independence is not a controversial proposition. Both Article II of the Constitution and the 12th Amendment, which clarified the selection of the vice president, provide that electors shall “vote by ballot,” a term of art referring to secret ballots rather than publicly cast votes.

By contrast, other constitutional provisions use words like “choose” or “election” that do not indicate secrecy. Voting in secret is the means by which electors may exercise their discretion, free from any attempt to control their vote.

Nonetheless, 29 states and the District of Columbia have laws on the books purporting to bind electors to vote for their party’s candidate or in accord with the state’s popular vote. Some enforce those mandates with fines or even criminal penalties—typically a misdemeanor charge. Others regard the casting of a “faithless” elector vote as resignation from the post and cancellation of the ballot. Despite dozens of electors choosing over the years to cast ballots for someone other than their party’s candidate or to abstain, these laws have never been enforced. Nonetheless, their very existence misleads the public and, even worse, chills electors from discharging their duty to exercise judgment.

The time is ripe to put an end to this legal charade and establish, as federal-court precedent, that the Constitution forbids enforcement of elector-binding mandates. The Supreme Court ruled in a 1952 decision, Ray v. Blair , that delegate pledges are unobjectionable, as nothing prevents an elector from announcing his intended vote beforehand. But the court recognized that enforcement of pledges raises constitutional concerns.

State courts that have considered the matter have held that elector pledges can impose, in the words of the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1948, only “a moral obligation, not a legal one.” As that court concluded, when a state attempts to “dictate to the electors the choice which they must make for president and vice president, it has invaded the field set apart to the electors by the Constitution of the United States, and such action cannot stand.”

Messrs. Rivkin and Grossman practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington, D.C. They represented Beau Correll, a delegate to the Republican National Convention, in his successful legal challenge to Virginia’s delegate-binding statute.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/let-the-electoral-college-do-its-duty-1473290734

Gun control proposals in the wake of Orlando could endanger constitutional rights

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Andrew M. Grossman in the Washington Post,  June 21, 2016

In the aftermath of horrific terrorist massacres such as the Orlando nightclub shooting, the natural impulse of the American people is to ask what the government can do to prevent such tragedies. Securing public safety is indeed the government’s most important job; keeping guns away from terrorists has obvious value. But this must be done in a way that complies with the Constitution.

This admonition has animated much of the recent debate about the rules governing National Security Agency surveillance of suspected terrorists. Regrettably, it has not been embraced in the gun control debate unfolding in the aftermath of Orlando.

Yet the Constitution’s due process protections are the vital safeguard of individual liberty and mitigate against arbitrary government action by setting the procedures the government must observe when it seeks to deprive an individual of a given substantive right.

Constitutionally “appropriate” procedure varies based on the importance of the right at issue and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that right, and the government’s interest. For example, while government officials may commit a person who is dangerous to himself or others on an emergency basis, a judicial determination of the validity of the commitment must follow. Law enforcement officers may arrest a person they believe to be guilty of a crime, but the person who has been arrested is entitled to appear before a judge.

Our legal traditions spell out the process that is due for the categories of people currently denied the right to keep and bear arms. Those include felons and those charged with felonies, people adjudged “mentally defective” and those dishonorably discharged from the military. The unifying factor is that people subject to these bars have all received their day in court.

But that’s not the case with the new gun control proposals. One proposal is to block gun sales to those named on the terrorist watch list maintained by the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center. The list, however, is entirely unsuited to that task.

According to National Counterterrorism Center guidance, agencies can add someone to the list based on a “reasonable suspicion” or “articulable evidence” that the person is a “known or suspected terrorist.” Listings can be based on anything from civilian tips and social-media postings to actual government investigations. The guidance makes clear that “irrefutable evidence or concrete facts are not necessary.”

The predictable result is a very long list, with entries of varying quality. As of July 2014, the main list contained about 800,000 names. More than 40 percent are designated as having “no recognized terrorist group affiliation.” This kind of list may be valuable for prioritizing counterterrorism activities, supporting investigations and determining where additional scrutiny may be warranted, such as with visa applications.

However, the watch list was never intended to be used to punish listed individuals by depriving them of their constitutionally protected rights. And, legally, it is unsuitable for that task. While there is an administrative redress process to remove a name from the list, there is no judicial review, no hearing and not even notification of whether a request was granted or denied, much less the grounds of the decision.

The no-fly list, which contained about 47,000 names in 2013, is subject to the same shortcomings. Individuals are never informed why they’ve been listed and have no opportunity for a hearing before a neutral judge to clear their names. In court filings, the government has explained that the list represents officials’ “predictive judgments” about who may pose a threat. Whatever the merits of that approach as applied to the eligibility for air travel, it falls far short of the kind of concrete proof and procedure necessary to deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right.

Even narrower approaches being bandied about raise similar concerns. For example, an amendment by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) would authorize the attorney general to block a firearms sale if the attorney general determined that the buyer was engaged in conduct relating to terrorism. The amendment does provide that a frustrated buyer may bring a lawsuit in federal court to challenge a denial. But its text suggests that this is just window dressing: The attorney general may withhold the evidence underlying the denial from the plaintiff, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove his innocence by rebutting evidence that he’s never seen.

Those agitating for firearms restrictions now should understand that the precedent they set is a dangerous one that extends far beyond the realm of the Second Amendment. If the government’s say-so is sufficient to block a gun sale — thereby abridging a right enumerated in the Constitution, with little or no ability for redress — what right wouldn’t be at risk of arbitrary deprivation, particularly among the powerless?

David B. Rivkin Jr. served in the White House counsel’s office and the Justice Department in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Andrew M. Grossman is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. They practice appellate and constitutional law in Washington.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gun-control-proposals-in-the-wake-of-orlando-may-endanger-constitutional-rights/2016/06/21/9c79dc88-37d8-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.html