Tag Archives: Mike Pompeo

Saudi Probe Is Not a Job For the U.N.

By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey

October 24, 2018, in the Wall Street Journal

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi has justly triggered international outrage. Yet calls for a United Nations-led investigation are neither justified nor prudent.

Those urging the U.N. to investigate argue that with so much at stake, no sovereign state can be trusted to conduct a full and fair probe. And there is a potential for bias—by the Saudis, whose officials are implicated; by Turkey, a rival of Riyadh; and by the U.S., the Saudis’ longstanding strategic partner. The same is true of many other states, including Britain, France and Germany, all of which have economic and strategic interests in the region.

But this objection proves too much. There are numerous instances in which countries have been accused of terrible crimes, including torture and extrajudicial killings. The list includes the U.S. and every other permanent member of the Security Council. This standard would disqualify virtually every U.N. member.

The general rule is that sovereign states both have the authority and the obligation to put their own houses in order by investigating and prosecuting alleged offenses. Only in the most extreme circumstances can an international inquiry be justified—such as when the state concerned is incapable of undertaking the investigation, or when the alleged offenses rise to the level of widespread international crimes, for which international law prescribes individual criminal responsibility.

The classic examples are war crimes and crimes against humanity, neither at issue here. The murder of a specific person has very rarely been the subject of an international investigation, as in the case of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s 2005 assassination. Syrian and Hezbollah involvement was suspected, and the Lebanese government was unable to conduct an investigation free of interference. Beirut thus agreed to the Security Council resolution establishing an independent investigative commission. Yet that probe was shunned by most intelligence services and failed to bring to justice any high-level culprits.

In this instance, Saudi Arabia is fully capable of investigating Khashoggi’s death and has the greatest interest in the matter. Khashoggi was a Saudi national; so, it appears, are his killers. There is obvious concern about the fairness of a Saudi investigation because of the potential involvement of high-level officials close to the royal family, and the conflicting Saudi explanations have been justifiably criticized. Yet the kingdom has been a respected member of the international community and surely understands a whitewash would severely damage its standing.

Turkey, too, has legitimate interests here. If Riyadh officially sanctioned Khashoggi’s killing in its Istanbul consulate, it would be an abuse of the diplomatic rights Turkey affords another sovereign under treaty. The U.S. and other Western powers can and should support and assist both Riyadh’s and Ankara’s investigations.

The U.S. has a strong interest in preserving international legal norms, grounded in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which recognize the nation-state as the highest authority and establish rules that apply equally to all states. There is a determined movement to undermine this traditional system in favor of a supranational authority. These efforts have frequently targeted America, including its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, renditions, interrogations and drone strikes. These matters have elicited condemnations at the U.N. and demands for international investigations. The U.S. has properly opposed such demands because it can and does investigate the allegations itself.

This leaves us with only one solution, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put it a few days ago: “We’re going to give them”—the Saudis and the Turks—“the space to complete their investigations of this incident, and when they issue their reports, we’ll form our judgment about the thoroughness, depth and the decisions they make about accountability connected to that.”

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice appellate and constitutional law and have argued before international legal bodies, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice.

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-probe-is-not-a-job-for-the-u-n-1540335772

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Time for a Rigorous National Debate About Surveillance

America is in a long war against a resilient enemy capable of striking the homeland, but U.S. intelligence capabilities are falling short of meeting the threat. The San Bernardino attackers were not flagged, despite their repeated visits to jihadist websites, alarming posts on social media, and suspicious financial transactions. The Boston Marathon bombers evaded timely detection, as did the would-be shooters in Garland, Texas, who had exchanged dozens of messages with a known terrorist overseas.

Paris and San Bernardino exemplify the two types of threats: overseas-trained terrorists, and online-radicalized lone wolves. Both exhibit distinctive behavioral and communications patterns that can be detected—but only if intelligence agencies have the right data and tools to analyze it.

Yet Washington is blunting its surveillance powers. Collection of phone metadata under the Patriot Act was banned by Congress and finally ceased at the end of November. Collection of the contents of specific targets’ communications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been dumbed down, with onerous requirements to secure the authorizing court order. The intelligence community feels beleaguered and bereft of political support. What’s needed is a fundamental upgrade to America’s surveillance capabilities.

Congress should pass a law re-establishing collection of all metadata, and combining it with publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a comprehensive, searchable database. Legal and bureaucratic impediments to surveillance should be removed. That includes Presidential Policy Directive-28, which bestows privacy rights on foreigners and imposes burdensome requirements to justify data collection.

There has been much debate about whether providers of communications hardware and software in the U.S. should be obliged to give the government backdoor access. Such a mandate would do little good, since terrorists would simply switch to foreign or home-built encryption. New technologies can cloak messages in background noise, rendering them difficult to detect.

Forcing terrorists into encrypted channels, however, impedes their operational effectiveness by constraining the amount of data they can send and complicating transmission protocols, a phenomenon known in military parlance as virtual attrition. Moreover, the use of strong encryption in personal communications may itself be a red flag.

Still, the U.S. must recognize that encryption is bringing the golden age of technology-driven surveillance to a close, which necessitates robust human intelligence. Pursuing every lead on terrorist activity would require a substantial increase in FBI funding and personnel—perhaps double or triple the number of field agents capable of tracking suspects. The Paris attacks, whose perpetrators exchanged numerous unencrypted text messages, were a grim reminder that capable but overstretched security services cannot thwart every terrorist plot.

Congress and the administration should also reassure the intelligence community by reiterating their full support for current surveillance programs. Revitalizing cooperation with foreign intelligence partners, which greatly decreased in the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures, is essential. This would require serious dialogue between world leaders and assurances that security has been tightened to prevent similar leaks.

Enhanced congressional oversight—a true partnership between the executive and Congress—is needed. Each month the intelligence community should provide classified briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees on how surveillance programs are working, what actionable information has been developed, and whether mistakes or abuses have occurred. These briefings should be recorded, and lawmakers should sign an acknowledgment of their attendance. This would bolster accountability and ensure that nobody suffers a memory lapse, such as Nancy Pelosi’s failure to remember that she was extensively briefed on the CIA’s enhanced-interrogation program.

None of this can happen without a rigorous national debate about surveillance, launched by congressional hearings. A review of the post-9/11 surveillance successes and failures needs to be a prominent part of this discourse. Most disagreements on surveillance are about policy, not law: Reasonable warrantless searches are compatible with the Fourth Amendment. So are searches of data shared with third parties, such as social-media posts—a highly valuable surveillance window, since people undergoing radicalization are prone to showcase their zealotry online.

In the wake of 9/11, surveillance reforms were adopted virtually overnight, with little discussion; they did not last. Hence the importance of building enduring public support. Surveillance should feature prominently in the 2016 presidential campaign, giving the next commander in chief a mandate and sense of obligation to implement reforms. Opposition to surveillance has been bipartisan, and the strategy for overcoming it must be bipartisan too.

Assertive efforts to defeat Islamic State will diminish, but not eliminate, the threat. Quick response by law enforcement is vital to limiting casualties and neutralizing attackers but cannot entirely prevent terrorism. Even the best 21st-century surveillance system won’t have a 100% success rate. But robust surveillance, drawing on a variety of technical and human intelligence and backed up by rigorous investigation of all leads, is the best way to mitigate the threat.

Mr. Pompeo, a Republican from Kansas, sits on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Rivkin, a constitutional lawyer, dealt with intelligence oversight while serving in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-a-rigorous-national-debate-about-surveillance-1451856106

A side agreement could void the Iran deal

By Mike Pompeo and David B. Rivkin Jr., September 6 2015 7:07PM in the Washington Post

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which requires the president to submit to Congress the nuclear agreement reached with Iran, represents an exceptional bipartisan congressional accommodation. Instead of submitting an agreement through the constitutionally proper mechanism — as a treaty requiring approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate — the act enables President Obama to go forward with the deal unless Congress disapproves it by a veto-proof margin. Unfortunately, the president has not complied with the act, jeopardizing his ability to implement the agreement.

The act defines “agreement,” with exceptional precision, to include not only the agreement between Iran and six Western powers but also “any additional materials related thereto, including . . . side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.” But the president has not given Congress a key side agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This document describes how key questions about the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program will be resolved, as well as the precise operational parameters of the verification regime to which Tehran will be subject.

This omission has important legal consequences. At the heart of the act is a provision, negotiated between Congress and the White House, freezing the president’s ability to “waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran” while Congress is reviewing the agreement.

That review period was supposed to take 60 days and is triggered the day the president submits the agreement to Congress. However, because the president failed to submit the agreement in full, as the law requires, the 60-day clock has not started, and the president remains unable lawfully to waive or lift statutory Iran-related sanctions. Indeed, since the act also provides for the transmittal of the agreement to Congress between July 10 and Sept. 7, the president’s ability to waive statutory sanctions will remain frozen in perpetuity if Congress does not receive the full agreement Monday .

Congress must now confront the grave issues of constitutional law prompted by the president’s failure to comply with his obligations under the act. This is not the first time this administration has disregarded clear statutory requirements, encroaching in the process upon Congress’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives. The fact that this has happened again in the context of a national security agreement vital to the United States and its allies makes the situation all the more serious.

For Congress to vote on the merits of the agreement without the opportunity to review all of its aspects would both effectively sanction the president’s unconstitutional conduct and be a major policy mistake. Instead, both houses should vote to register their view that the president has not complied with his obligations under the act by not providing Congress with a copy of an agreement between the IAEA and Iran, and that, as a result, the president remains unable to lift statutory sanctions against Iran. Then, if the president ignores this legal limit on his authority, Congress can and should take its case to court.

Mike Pompeo, a Republican, represents Kansas in the House and is a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. David B. Rivkin Jr., a constitutional litigator and a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-side-agreement-could-void-the-iran-deal/2015/09/06/f35ce8aa-532d-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html

Crippling the Intelligence We Used to Get bin Laden

Obama’s directive to protect the privacy of foreigners will make Americans less safe.

By Mike Pompeo and David B. Rivkin Jr.

On Jan. 17, in response to former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s theft of U.S. intelligence secrets and concerns over the NSA’s bulk metadata collection, President Obama issued a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-28) that neither strengthens American security nor enhances Americans’ privacy. To the contrary, it undermines our intelligence capabilities in service of a novel cause: foreign privacy interests.

All nations collect and analyze foreign communications or signals, what is known as “signals intelligence.” American technological prowess has produced the world’s most abundant stream of signals intelligence, thwarting plots against the U.S. and saving lives. PPD-28 threatens American safety by restricting the use of this signals intelligence.

First, under the new directive, U.S. officials are required to ensure that all searches of foreign signals intelligence are limited to six purposes: countering foreign espionage, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity, threats to U.S. or allied forces, and transnational crime.

Such policy guidance is appropriate in principle, but these limitations are mere window dressing. Intelligence activities are already heavily scrutinized by executive-branch lawyers to protect Americans’ privacy. Yet the intelligence community must now operate under the presumption that they are somehow engaged in wrongdoing and must justify each and every step by reference to a proper “purpose” to rebut that presumption. This will make intelligence analysts overly cautious and reduce their flexibility in handling security threats.

Second, PPD-28 extends the same privacy protections to foreigners that now apply to data regarding “U.S. persons,” defined as U.S. citizens anywhere in the world and anyone in the U.S. The most visible result will be that intelligence concerning foreigners will contain redactions of material that may have value to U.S. security and diplomacy. The policy contains an exception for information “relevant” to understanding the substantive content of foreign intelligence, but analysts will inevitably face pressure to go with the redaction rather than bring in the lawyers to justify an exception.

These new policies aren’t required by law. Just as foreign terrorists should not be read their Miranda rights, the U.S. Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable, doesn’t apply to foreigners outside the U.S. And international law imposes no limitations on foreign surveillance. Yet in a stunning display of naïveté, Mr. Obama says it is crucial that people in foreign countries, from Pakistan to Peru, understand that “the United States respects their privacy too.” The leak last week of the recording of a sensitive phone call between two senior State Department officials regarding Ukraine—almost certainly the result of Kremlin surveillance—vividly indicates how other countries feel about protecting Americans’ privacy.

PPD-28 applies only to signals intelligence and has nothing to say about human intelligence from spies, defectors and friendly intelligence services. But this too reveals the senselessness of the new directive. If we could induce an al Qaeda leader to defect, everything in his possession could be used immediately, helping to make connections and capture or kill our enemies. But if we obtained the same information through signals intelligence, much of it would have to be redacted in the name of a privacy “right” not recognized by U.S. or international law.

This disparate treatment of signals and human intelligence will complicate “connecting the dots.” Human and signals intelligence should work together to inform policy makers of a possible threat as quickly and thoroughly as possible. But imposing different restrictions on intelligence data from human and technological sources prevents that from happening. Different data regarding the same threats will be subject to different legal requirements and limitations on use and disclosure. That will require more lawyering and more time, neither of which helps U.S. security.

History provides numerous examples of how vital it is to integrate signals and human intelligence. Their interplay has long been used to direct troop movements, bombing campaigns and drone strikes, and it was crucial to finding Osama bin Laden.

Consider the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Seeking to upend the strategic nuclear balance, Moscow installed short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, reasoning that U.S. intelligence wouldn’t detect them until they were operational. American spy planes provided only low-quality photographs (signals intelligence) of the missile sites.

But because Soviet Lt. Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a double agent, had provided British and U.S. intelligence with information about the standard Soviet missile-base layout, analysts were able to interpret the spy-plane data to ascertain what Moscow was doing in Cuba. This kind of synergy between signals data and human intelligence will be stymied by policies that undermine flexibility in the use of intelligence from different sources.

Under the Constitution, national security and intelligence are largely the president’s responsibility. Because President Obama has decided to recognize a foreign right to privacy, Congress has little ability to check his move. But lawmakers can and should shine a bright light on PPD-28 and hold him accountable for a directive that will hobble our foreign-intelligence capabilities, even as the world spies on us and threats to Americans multiply.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303519404579353322885979550?KEYWORDS=david+rivkin

Mr. Pompeo, a Republican from Kansas, is a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Rivkin is a partner at Baker Hostetler LLP and served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.