Tag Archives: Barack Obama

Nevada’s Right Choice on Immigration

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY, Feb. 2, 2015 7:40 p.m. ET

A very public dispute broke out last week when Nevada Attorney General Adam Laxalt went against Gov. Brian Sandoval’s wishes and joined a lawsuit filed by 25 other states challenging President Obama’s imposition of his immigration reform policies by executive action.

Messrs. Sandoval and Laxalt are both Republicans who agree that the current immigration system is broken and that comprehensive reform is necessary. But Mr. Sandoval opposes litigation and has suggested that new immigration reform legislation is the best way to proceed.

Yet on Jan. 26 Mr. Laxalt announced that Nevada had joined the plaintiff states in Texas v. United States of America. “As Nevada’s chief legal officer,” he explained, “I am directed by Nevada’s Constitution and laws to take legal action whenever necessary ‘to protect and secure the interest of the state.’ ”

Mr. Laxalt was right to join the suit. Mr. Sandoval’s legislative path will neither solve America’s vexing immigration problems nor rein in a president who has ignored the Constitution’s limits on executive power.

Texas v. United States of America challenges the president’s use of an executive order to suspend federal immigration laws that require, among other things, deportation of undocumented immigrants and strict limits on who may lawfully work in the U.S. The Constitution requires that the president “Take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and provides no exemption for laws with which the president disagrees.

As the Supreme Court stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), ruling against President Harry Truman’s seizure of the nation’s steel industry during the Korean War, “the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”

The president is, in other words, stuck with laws passed by Congress and signed into law by previous presidents. The reason for this is at the heart of America’s constitutional separation of powers—the power to make laws and to execute them are divided between separate branches of government, Congress and the president respectively.

The third branch—the judiciary—has the power to say what the law is, including when the president and or Congress have crossed the constitutional lines. It is only litigation before the courts that can now vindicate the most basic tenets of our constitutional system.

However desirable immigration reform might be, congressional action won’t prevent this president from ignoring provisions in a new law that he dislikes or opposes. Only a determination by the courts that he has overstepped his constitutional authority can do that. Unless the president’s ability to play lawmaker is decisively defeated in litigation, congressional legislation on any contentious public-policy issue would be inherently futile.

Nor is Mr. Laxalt obliged to follow Gov. Sandoval’s preference. Nevada law permits the governor to direct the attorney general to bring or defend an action in the courts. But as Mr. Laxalt explained, it also imposes an entirely independent obligation on the attorney general to take such action if he believes it necessary to secure the state’s interests.

All American states, including Nevada, have critical interests at stake here, both because of the burdens President Obama’s suspension of federal immigration law imposes on their state budgets and governments, but also because of their basic character as coequal sovereigns. The Constitution is a “grand bargain” among the states and the American people. That bargain includes a powerful federal government, but one that has limited powers that may be exercised only in accordance with the institutional arrangements the Constitution creates.

The separation of legislative and executive authority is among the most important limitations on federal power. It is now up to the federal courts to restore the Constitution’s balance between the president and Congress and between the federal government and the states. Mr. Laxalt made the right choice. Those state attorneys general that have yet to join Texas v. United States of America should follow his lead.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey practice law in Washington, D.C., and served in the White House and Justice Department during the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-rivkin-and-lee-casey-nevadas-right-choice-on-immigration-1422924012

How Congress Can Use Its Leverage on Iran

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And LEE A. CASEY, Jan. 20, 2015

Nuclear talks between Iran and the U.S. recommenced Jan. 14, ahead of full international talks with senior officials from the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China and Germany two days later. A final agreement is to be reached no later than June 30. Nothing less than Middle Eastern and global security hangs in the balance.

That security depends on verifiable elimination of Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is likely to accept a deal leaving in place a substantial Iranian nuclear-weapons infrastructure, including uranium-enrichment capability, long-range ballistic missiles and the ability to deploy a rudimentary nuclear force on short notice. A course correction that only Congress can effect is urgently needed.

It is difficult for Congress to stop a president determined to sign an agreement with foreign leaders. And as this newspaper pointed out in a recent editorial, President Obama has threatened to veto any legislation to impose further sanctions on Iran if the June 30 deadline is not met. Still, Tehran’s insistence that existing U.S. sanctions be lifted as part of a nuclear-weapons agreement gives U.S. lawmakers substantial leverage. The collapse of oil prices, which dealt a heavy blow to the already weakened Iranian economy, has further increased this leverage. Here is what Congress should do:

First, Congress should insist that any Iranian agreement take the form of a treaty. The Constitution requires that treaties be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. At the time it was adopted, and throughout most of U.S. history, agreements fundamentally ordering the relationship between the U.S. and foreign nations took the form of treaties, not executive orders. A mere executive agreement, which Mr. Obama may use to evade congressional constraints here, would be constitutionally insufficient.

Iran, too, should insist on a treaty and—to ensure sanctions ultimately are lifted—on congressional involvement in the negotiations. Presidents can unilaterally terminate both executive agreements and treaties, but executive agreements carry far less weight. Presidents are more likely to revise or revoke a predecessor’s agreements or orders than they are to repudiate treaties. The Iranians have already made clear that any deal would require their parliament’s approval. It is disconcerting to see Tehran treating its legislative branch with more deference than this U.S. president is treating Congress.

Second, the entire Congress—Senate and House—should be involved. A treaty ratified by the Senate has the force and effect of law. But the current Iranian sanctions regime is so complex—having been created over decades and involving an intricate and tangled web of statutes, executive orders and implementing regulations—that only new legislation can amend or eliminate it in a manner that ensures Iranian compliance.

Presidential orders nullifying specific sanctions, such as enabling U.S. financial institutions to return to business with currently blacklisted Iranian banks, should be unacceptable to the Iranians since such actions could be reversed by President Obama’s successor. Indeed, Tehran has repeatedly expressed concern that the U.S. might not deliver on its sanctions-lifting commitments.

Third, Congress should pass legislation now clearly stating the parameters of an acceptable nuclear deal with Iran, emphasizing the need to eliminate any Iranian breakout capability. It should also put the Iranians and our allies on notice that, absent congressional approval, the president cannot deliver comprehensive and permanent relief from the existing sanctions statutes.

This would prevent the worst possible scenario: Mr. Obama makes unilateral sanctions-related commitments, on which he ultimately cannot deliver. Tehran would thus have a perfect diplomatic cover to continue its nuclear-weapons program, while casting the U.S. as the deal breaker.

The legislation should lift sanctions in stages, as Iran begins to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs in a transparent, permanent and verifiable manner, finally complying with its own international obligations. Congress should make clear that failure to submit an agreement as a treaty will lead to the imposition of an even broader and harsher sanctions regime against Iran. The statute should impose these sanctions now, slated to go into effect by a date certain, unless Congress repeals them after reviewing the final deal with Tehran.

These standby sanctions should have no waiver provisions. Given the administration’s willful nonenforcement of other statutes it dislikes, the legislation should enable private parties to bring civil actions against sanction-busting companies and persons. They can be patterned after the private enforcement provisions in the False Claims Act, which allow private citizens to sue on behalf of the federal government.

A genuine and enforceable deal ending Iran’s nuclear programs would give the president and the United States a major foreign-policy triumph. But this is possible only with the full cooperation of Congress, which Mr. Obama needs to treat as a partner and not as an enemy to be ignored, outmaneuvered, stonewalled or steamrolled.

Messrs. Rivkin and Casey served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. They are partners in the Washington, D.C., office of Baker & Hostetler LLP. Mr. Rivkin is also a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-b-rivkin-jr-and-lee-a-casey-how-congress-can-use-its-leverage-on-iran-1421800630

Federal Antidrug Law Goes Up in Smoke

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY

Dec. 28, 2014 6:52 p.m. ET

The attorneys general of Nebraska and Oklahoma have asked the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional Colorado’s law legalizing marijuana. The lawsuit states that, “The Constitution and the federal anti-drug laws do not permit the development of a patchwork of state and local pro-drug policies and licensed-distribution schemes throughout the country which conflict with federal laws.”

Many conservatives have criticized Nebraska and Oklahoma for being “fair-weather federalists” because their claims hinge, in part, on Gonzales v. Raich, a 2005 Supreme Court decision, upholding the broad reach of Congress’s power to regulate commerce.

Conservatives’ ire instead should be directed at the Obama administration’s decision to suspend enforcement of the federal law prohibiting marijuana—a decision so warping the rule of law that the complaining states’ reliance on Raich is justified and necessary.

In 1970 Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, or CSA, listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, and thus illegal to manufacture, distribute or possess. Nonetheless, in August 2013 the Obama administration employed its now-signature response to disfavored laws, issuing a memo directing U.S. law enforcement to refrain from using “limited investigative and prosecutorial resources” to pursue marijuana-related violations of the CSA in states that chose to regulate marijuana businesses. The new law-by-memo told states they are free to ignore the federal ban.Read more…

The Controlled Substances Act is an exercise of Congress’s express power to regulate interstate commerce. The law declares that a “major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce” and that even locally grown and sold drugs have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Drugs manufactured, distributed or consumed within a single state cannot be tolerated because they undermine Congress’s desire to stop interstate drug trafficking.

State laws legalizing and regulating marijuana—in Colorado, Alaska, Oregon and Washington—conflict with the CSA and cripple its effectiveness. States cannot be required to enforce federal law. But as the Supreme Court held in A rizona v. United States (2012), when the federal government doesn’t enforce its own laws, states still “may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.” Colorado’s decision to legalize and regulate the sale of marijuana undermines the Controlled Substances Act, giving a major boost to all segments of that business. Indeed, in an interview this month Colorado’s attorney general, John Suthers, acknowledged that his state is “becoming a major exporter of marijuana.”

Neighboring states such as Nebraska and Oklahoma have seen a significant influx of high-potency marijuana purchased in and directed toward Colorado markets, increasing those states’ law-enforcement costs. If the CSA is a valid federal statute, the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause (Article VI, paragraph 2) instructs that conflicting state laws cannot be allowed to stand. This is where Raich comes in.

In Raich, individuals who used marijuana pursuant to California’s “compassionate use” law asserted that the CSA was unconstitutional as it applied to them, because Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce couldn’t reach state-sanctioned intrastate marijuana use. The Raich majority refused to create a CSA “exemption” for medicinal marijuana, reasoning that “a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana . . . locally cultivated for personal use . . . may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.” It concluded that the CSA was a valid exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce and that “marijuana possession and cultivation ‘in accordance with state law’ cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond congressional reach.”

Even the pro-federalism dissent by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor —which asserted that state compassionate-use laws could peacefully coexist with the CSA—acknowledged that medical marijuana was qualitatively distinct from recreational marijuana. More specifically, Justice O’Connor believed that the relatively small population of medical marijuana users didn’t have a “substantial effect” on the interstate market for recreational marijuana—the market Congress intended to extinguish in the Controlled Substances Act.

Whatever one thinks about Raich, it is still binding precedent. Colorado’s law is not about a limited, medical-need exemption for marijuana use. It is a full-scale defiance of the CSA. There is no federalism defense to Colorado’s law, unless one believes that Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce doesn’t include the power to regulate the buying and selling of marijuana, a commercial market that involves interstate transportation, lures sellers and consumers from other states, and now generates more than $7 million in tax revenue for Colorado every month.

The Controlled Substances Act can be amended or repealed. Congress has taken a step in this direction by providing in its recent omnibus spending bill that the Justice Department cannot use appropriated funds to prevent states from implementing “laws that authorize the use, distribution or cultivation of medicinal marijuana.”

This development may lead the Supreme Court to take another look at the CSA’s constitutionality, something that could occur in the context of the Oklahoma and Nebraska lawsuit against Colorado. Alternatively, Attorney General Eric Holdercould use his authority under the Controlled Substances Act to remove marijuana from Schedule I. But Coloradans—or the citizens of any other state—lack the power in our constitutional regime to enact a law that conflicts with the CSA.

When federal power has been legitimately invoked, states may not go rogue. When they do, sister states that can demonstrate concrete injury are entitled to obtain a court declaration that state laws in conflict with federal law are unconstitutional. Normally such lawsuits wouldn’t be necessary because the federal government would enforce its superior law against rogue states. But these aren’t ordinary constitutional times, and it isn’t “fair-weather federalism” to defend these core constitutional principles.

Mr. Rivkin, a constitutional litigator, served in the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Ms. Foley is a professor of constitutional law at Florida International University College of Law.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/david-b-rivkin-jr-and-elizabeth-price-foley-federal-antidrug-law-goes-up-in-smoke-1419810742

Obama Cynically Cut China Deal To Force Energy Price Hikes On U.S Consumers

Whiplash is an occupational risk for those keeping track of President Barack Obama’s muscular exertions of executive power. In just the few weeks since his party’s shellacking in the midterm elections, the president has made major moves on immigration, Internet regulation, and air pollution, just to name a few.

One problem with activist government is that too many actions that merit serious concern and skepticism fall by the wayside. Among them is the president’s announced climate deal with China, which hit front pages a week after the election before sliding into obscurity, overtaken by so many other events. But like the president’s immigration actions, this actually is something new, and more than a little sinister.

A Method to His Double-Dealing Madness

Taken at face value, the deal doesn’t make any sense—at least, not from the United States national-interest perspective. The United States agrees to costly massive cuts in greenhouse gas emissions: 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, far more than the 17-percent cut the president previously targeted. In return, China agrees to…do nothing for 16 years, until 2030. Its emissions won’t increase beyond their level that year, according to the agreement. While this might appear to be a concession, it really isn’t: although emissions are growing at a rapid clip in China today, most projections see them leveling off right around—you guessed it—2030. In other words, this may be the most one-sided deal since the Dutch purchased Manhattan.

But there is a method to what would otherwise seem to be pure madness. As the numbers suggest, the deal has just about nothing to do with China, which will go on its merry way building coal-fired plants to slake its thirst for cheap and secure energy. But it has everything to do with Americans’ continued reliance on coal-generated electricity.

Radically cutting U.S. greenhouse gas emissions has been a central goal for the president since taking office. The centerpiece of this drive was supposed to be a cap-and-trade system, but that was dead on arrival even when Democrats controlled Congress. So the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been dutifully marching forward with a slew of politically-challenged and legally-questionable regulations, from its first wave of permitting requirements for new facilities emitting greenhouse gases (struck down in part by the Supreme Court) to its proposed “performance standards” for new power plants (withdrawn and then re-proposed following legal objections) to its recently-proposed “Clean Power Plan” to cap emissions from existing power plants (already the subject of litigation and withering criticism).

The China Deal Is Smoke and Mirrors

But unilateral action has its risks. If EPA stumbles at all in its roll-out of the Clean Power Plan, that could delay environmentalists’ goal of regulating existing plants for years, particularly if Obama’s successor doesn’t share his priorities. Even if the agency does meet its internal deadlines, there’s still no guarantee the next administration won’t roll back its plans.

This is where the China deal fits in. It provides political cover by creating the appearance—really, the false impression—that the United States isn’t alone in sacrificing economic growth to lower emissions and, in particular, that the president isn’t putting U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage to Chinese industry.

There’s also diplomatic cover, in that the next president will be at least hesitant to walk away from an international agreement, binding or not. Much diplomacy is conducted informally, and, all else being equal, nations and their leaders do well to keep their word.

And there’s a measure of legal cover. To be sure, an executive agreement like this one is not legally binding—a treaty, after all, has to be ratified by the Senate, which the president knows is politically impossible. But the courts are generally more deferential to policy decisions that have foreign-policy consequences, given the president’s unique competence and authority in that area. Expect our bilateral “obligations” to China to occupy a place of prominence in legal briefs defending the Clean Power Plan, which is conveniently referenced in the U.S.-China executive agreement, from the legal challenges that are sure to follow its introduction.

Will the Courts Care?

Savvy as it may be, the China deal is also remarkably cynical and has the air of being too-clever-by-half. Lacking the power to simply change domestic laws—well, at least until recently—President Obama is attempting a partial end-run through the exercise of his potent but carefully circumscribed foreign-policy powers. There’s absolutely no reason the deal had to be with China; the Seychelles or Tonga would have worked just as well.

This treads a bit too close to Justice Scalia’s concern, expressed in a treaty-power decision last year, that the Obama administration’s position was a recipe for circumventing the Constitution’s limitations on federal power. Under an unbounded treaty power, he explained, “negotiating a treaty with Latvia providing that neither sovereign would permit the carrying of guns near schools” would be sufficient to resuscitate the statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms near schools that the Courtpreviously struck down for exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers. Notably, at oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verilli said it was simply “unimaginable” that the president or Congress would abuse foreign-policy powers to aggrandize their own authority in domestic affairs.

And yet. Remember when it was unimaginable that the president would act unilaterally to alter the legal status of millions of immigrants?

As with the president’s immigration actions, the creative repurposing of executive power that underlies the China deal will have unexpected consequences. If international agreements become just another tool of domestic policy, subject to reconsideration every four or eight years, will it diminish the standing of our word among nations? Or will it ossify U.S. domestic policy, as policy choices are taken off the table to comply with existing agreements?

The key question is whether Congress and the courts will recognize the China deal for what it is—a cynical exercise of bogus internationalism directed entirely at domestic affairs—and treat it accordingly.

Messers. Rivkin and Grossman practice law, with a particular focus on constitutional litigation, at BakerHostetler in Washington DC. Rivkin served at the Justice Department and the White House counsel’s office under presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Source: http://thefederalist.com/2014/12/03/obama-cynically-cut-china-deal-to-force-energy-price-hikes-on-u-s-consumers/

Obama’s Immigration Enablers

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY

A few hours before announcing his new immigration policy, President Obama received an opinion blessing its legality from the Office of Legal Counsel. Regrettably, the OLC’s made-to-order legal analysis is shockingly flawed in five major respects.

First, the OLC justified the policy as a prioritization of government’s “limited resources.” But the executive order does more than prioritize. It rewrites existing law. Illegal immigrants won’t be deported if they aren’t a threat to national security, public safety or border security. Beyond these three categories, deportation may be pursued only if it serves an “important federal interest.”

Under current law, by contrast, anyone entering the U.S. illegally is a “deportable alien” who “shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed.” The president’s policy transforms an entire category of aliens deemed deportable into two different categories, whereby some are deportable and some aren’t. This is a shift in kind, not merely degree.

A president prioritizing resources would do what previous presidents have done: enforce the entirety of immigration law, while allowing prosecutors to make case-by-case determinations. By announcing a global policy of nonenforcement against certain categories, Mr. Obama condones unlawful behavior, weakening the law’s deterrent impact, and allows lawbreakers to remain without fear of deportation. As he puts it, “All we’re saying is we are not going to deport you.” These individuals are no longer deportable, although Congress has declared them so.

Second, the OLC incorrectly concludes that the president’s plan involves case-by-case scrutiny. The OLC admits “a general policy of nonenforcement that forecloses the exercise of case-by-case discretion poses ‘special risks’ that the agency has exceeded the bounds of its enforcement discretion.” It argues, however, that there are no “removable aliens whose removal may not be pursued under any circumstances.” And although the policy “limits the discretion of immigration officials . . . it does not eliminate that discretion entirely.”

It is absurd to assert that the theoretical possibility that a small percentage of the more than four million likely applicants may be rejected is meaningful “prosecutorial discretion.” This is illustrated by Mr. Obama’s 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy. Of 521,815 applications considered on a “case-by-case” basis, only 3% have been rejected. With an approval rate of 97%, the president’s criteria are rubber-stamped. This is a categorical exemption from the law.

Third, even if Mr. Obama’s plan is accepted as case-by-case discretion, it creates a remedy—deferred deportation—for a category that Congress hasn’t allowed and the president lacks authority to create. The OLC memo lumps deferred deportation with other kinds of deportation relief, such as parole, temporary protected status and deferred enforced departure. But each of these has been specifically authorized by Congress, or—in the case of deferred enforced departure—is supported by the president’s foreign-affairs power.

While Congress has authorized deferred deportation for specific categories, lawmakers haven’t authorized it for those to whom President Obama wishes to extend it—the parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. The OLC claims that this isn’t important because deferred deportation “has become a regular feature of the immigration removal system that has been acknowledged by both Congress and the Supreme Court.” It cites the 1999 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee case.

In that case, members of the Palestinian Liberation Front claimed the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s refusal to defer their deportation constituted discrimination. The court disagreed, ruling that a recently passed statute was “clearly designed to give some measure of protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions” and deny adjudication of such discrimination claims. The ruling merely acknowledged that Congress didn’t want federal courts hearing discrimination lawsuits based on a failure to grant deferred action. It didn’t consider or endorse the legality of deferred deportation.

The OLC next claims that Congress has “acquiesced” to deferred deportation. It cites statutes authorizing deferred deportation for battered spouses of U.S. citizens, and instances where individuals entitled to visas—such as victims of human trafficking or college students affected by Hurricane Katrina—needed more time to obtain visas or fulfill the visa’s purpose. Congress’s authorization of deferred deportation for narrow categories doesn’t allow a president to create broad new categories, particularly since his deferred deportation creates entitlement to benefits such as work permits, and because the category of aliens created by President Obama’s policy weren’t entitled to stay.

Fourth, the OLC claims that past presidents have taken similar actions, yet it fundamentally misrepresents their legal basis. The primary example is George H.W. Bush ’s 1990 Family Fairness Policy (FFP), which affected an estimated 1.5 million children and spouses of those granted amnesty by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.

The FFP, however, was consonant with existing statutes. The FFP granted not deferred deportation, but “voluntary departure” for up to one year. Voluntary departure allows deportable individuals to voluntarily depart the country, on their own dime, in lieu of being forcibly removed. Their status as “deportable” individuals never changes.

The FFP was grounded in the then-existing voluntary-departure statute, which stated, “The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation proceedings . . . to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation.” The FFP didn’t contradict existing law or attempt to recategorize deportable aliens.

Fifth, the OLC ignores that the new Obama policy profoundly harms the states, which bear the costs of educating and providing health care to millions of illegal immigrants now allowed to remain. The policy also injures state sovereignty.

In Arizona v. U.S., the Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that federal immigration law pre-empts much of state power over immigration. But when a president unilaterally acts, it deprives states of their police power and representation in Congress, imposing changes without democratic deliberation. While federal immigration law can pre-empt state power, there can be no pre-emption when a president exceeds his constitutional authority by rewriting the law.

The OLC’s memo endorses a view of presidential power that has never been advanced by even the boldest presidential advocates. If this view holds, future presidents can unilaterally gut tax, environmental, labor or securities laws by enforcing only those portions with which they agree. This is a dangerous precedent that cannot be allowed to stand.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/articles/david-rivkin-and-elizabeth-price-foley-obamas-immigration-enablers-1416872973

Mr. Rivkin is a constitutional litigator and served in the Justice Department and White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Ms. Foley is a constitutional law professor at the Florida International University College of Law.

Is Obama trying to pack the DC appeals court?

By David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Andrew M. Grossman 

The D.C. Circuit is the nation’s top regulatory court, responsible for scrutinizing many of the federal government’s most expensive and far-reaching actions. No wonder, then, that President Barack Obama is now trying to push three new judges onto the court and tilt it decisively in his favor. A great deal is at stake here for the U.S. economy, and it is high time for the Senate to have its say.

For a president with an aggressive second-term regulatory agenda, the D.C. Circuit may be a greater impediment than the Supreme Court. By statute, the court hears all challenges to nationwide rules under the Clean Air Act, as well as many major challenges to regulations affecting water, labor relations, securities law, and other fields. It vets agencies’ compliance with constitutional requirements. More than a third of cases in the D.C. Circuit are administrative appeals, compared to 16 percent in other appeals courts. And because the Supreme Court takes so few cases each year, the D.C. Circuit’s word is typically the last when it comes to regulatory challenges.

The court hasn’t exactly been clamoring for more judges. It has the equivalent of 11.25 full-time judges: eight active judges, split 4-4 between Democratic and Republican appointees, plus another six senior judges whose workloads add up to 3.25 full-time judges. While the court has three vacancies, they are not among the 32 “judicial emergencies” identified by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts—and the president hasn’t even made nominations to most of those seats.  Moreover, the court’s caseload is among the lowest of the courts of appeals, at 88 cases per judge, and declining. According to one current judge, “If any more judges were added now, there wouldn’t be enough work to go around.”

So why three new judges? And why now?

The best explanation is that the court has played an important role checking the Obama administration’s most legally adventuresome actions. It blocked Obama administration regulations that required some states to reduce air pollution by more than they actually emitted and struck down the president’s attempt to bypass the Senate by “recess” appointing pro-union lawyers to the National Labor Relations Board when the Senate was still in session.

Just recently, it ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to follow the law and reopen consideration of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, which the Administration had shut down for political reasons. The court felt the need to remind the administration: “The President and federal agencies may not ignore statutory mandates or prohibitions merely because of policy disagreement with Congress.”

To be clear, the court is not set against Obama’s agenda—far from it. Where agencies hew to the letter of the law and present reasoned explanations for their actions, they fare well. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has turned back challenges to the vast majority of the Obama administration rules, including EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations, which many observers viewed as legally vulnerable for deviating from the language of the Clean Air Act. (The Supreme Court recently agreed to review that precise issue.)

Problems typically arise when regulators overreach by playing fast and loose with the law to carry out their political agendas. As D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel has explained, “You’d be surprised how often agencies don’t seem to have given their authorizing statutes so much as a quick skim.”

The president is right to fear that his agencies may face tough going in the D.C. Circuit during his second term. Despite a number of high-profile court losses for failure to follow the law, President Obama declared after his reelection that he intends to act even more aggressively. He said that he is “not going to…wait for Congress” to carry out his agenda. “Wherever we have an opportunity and I have the executive authority to go ahead and get some things done, we’re just going to go ahead and do ‘em.” He has followed through on that promise, pushing the EPA to effectively ban new coal-fired power plants and to issue standards for existing plants that are likely to be among the most expensive regulations ever.  EPA is also contemplating new rules targeting natural gas.

Thus, the president’s rush to place three liberal stalwarts on the court. Today, the D.C. Circuit enjoys a reputation for careful legal reasoning and attention to detail. It is sensitive to the tough policy choices faced by public officials, without unduly deferring to their judgments on issues of law. For those very reasons, it poses a real threat to the president’s plans to skirt the normal lawmaking process—that is, working with Congress—in favor of unilateral action.

It’s easier to win in court, of course, when you get to pick the judges.  A second reason for the rush is to prevent the Senate from careful review of his nominees’ records.

This, in particular, should give Senators pause, because it stands in the way of carrying out their constitutional duty to provide “advice and consent” on judicial nominations. Given the stakes, a full airing of the nominees’ records is warranted, followed by careful deliberation by the Senate.

Rivkin Jr. and Grossman practice law in the Washington office of BakerHostetler. Rivkin served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

 

Sourcehttp://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/188872-is-obama-trying-to-pack-the-dc-appeals-court

Why the President’s ObamaCare Maneuver May Backfire

By postponing the employer mandate, Obama has given millions of Americans the legal standing to sue.

By  DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. AND LEE A. CASEY

President Obama’s announcement on July 2 that he is suspending the Affordable Care Act’s employer health-insurance mandate may well have exposed his actions to judicial review—even though that is clearly what he sought to avoid.

The health-care reform law’s employer mandate requires businesses with more than 50 employees to provide a congressionally prescribed set of health-insurance benefits or pay a penalty calculated at about $2,000 per employee. The law was to take effect on Jan. 1, 2014, but Mr. Obama has “postponed” its application until 2015. His aim, the administration said, was to give employers more time to comply with the new rules. But it was also seen as a way to avoid paying at least part of ObamaCare’s mounting political price in the 2014 congressional elections.

Whatever the reason, the president does not have the power to stop the implementation of a law. If there is one bedrock constitutional legal principle, it is that the president must “faithfully execute” federal statutes. He cannot suspend laws he dislikes on policy grounds or because he fears their political consequences.

Mr. Obama, however, has made a habit of exercising an unlawful suspending power, refusing to enforce selected federal laws, including various provisions of the immigration laws against young, undocumented aliens; work requirements enacted as part of the 1996 federal welfare reform law; and the testing accountability provisions of the No Child Left Behind education law.

One key problem with suspension power—aside from the fact that it destroys the balance of power between the two political branches—is that, when skillfully exercised, it sidelines the judiciary. The Constitution requires that a party commencing litigation must have what is commonly called “standing,” i.e., the party must have suffered or will suffer a legal injury that a court can redress. A determined president can head off litigation by effectively rewriting federal statutes in ways that do not create individual injuries so no party has standing.

By suspending the Affordable Care Act’s employer insurance mandate, however, the president has potentially given millions of Americans the necessary standing to challenge his conduct. This is because the Affordable Care Act is a highly integrated law, with many of its key provisions dependent on each other. In addition to the employer mandate, the law also contains an “individual mandate,” requiring most Americans to sign up for a required level of health-insurance coverage or pay a penalty.

The individual mandate was one of the core parts of the Affordable Care Act considered by the Supreme Court in the 2012 case of NFIB v. Sebelius, where the court upheld the statute against constitutional attack. Throughout that litigation, the Obama administration portrayed the individual mandate as an “integral part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation” that included the employer insurance mandate, which was intended to give millions of Americans a way of meeting their new obligation to have health insurance. In other words, suspending the employer insurance mandate prevents the individual insurance mandate from working the way Congress intended.

Like the employer mandate, the individual mandate by law will take effect in January 2014 (unless the president postpones that as well). Individuals who will then have to buy their own health insurance will arguably have suffered an injury sufficient to give them standing to sue.

Once in court, these litigants can argue that the very integrated nature of the Affordable Care Act would make it unlawful to apply one part against them, while suspending another section. They can also argue that only Congress can determine whether, once a statute is fundamentally changed post-enactment, it should survive or fall.

This inquiry usually arises when courts, having invalidated on constitutional grounds part of a statute, must determine whether or not Congress would have wanted the valid remaining parts of the law to remain in effect. The relevant constitutional doctrine is called “severability.”

As the Supreme Court noted in the leading severability case, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England (2006), the ultimate fate of the revised statute is decided based on the “legislative intent.” In the case of the Affordable Care Act, if the courts were, for example, to determine that the employer insurance mandate is unconstitutional, the well-established severability analysis would lead them to conclude that the individual mandate (and likely the entire law) must also fall because Congress did not intend those provisions to operate in the absence of the employer insurance mandate. The president’s suspension of that part of the law, therefore, should also produce the same result, rendering the remainder of the statute unenforceable.

This argument should find favor with judges who are weary of the use of suspension power that improperly aggrandizes presidential authority, diminishes congressional power, and denies the judiciary an opportunity to have its say. Courts would have to conclude that the whole statute must fall while the president’s suspension is in effect. While reaching this conclusion, they might also declare the suspension itself unconstitutional. Both results would mark a significant win for the American people.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323368704578596360026187772.html?mod=wsj_streaming_stream