Time for a Rigorous National Debate About Surveillance

America is in a long war against a resilient enemy capable of striking the homeland, but U.S. intelligence capabilities are falling short of meeting the threat. The San Bernardino attackers were not flagged, despite their repeated visits to jihadist websites, alarming posts on social media, and suspicious financial transactions. The Boston Marathon bombers evaded timely detection, as did the would-be shooters in Garland, Texas, who had exchanged dozens of messages with a known terrorist overseas.

Paris and San Bernardino exemplify the two types of threats: overseas-trained terrorists, and online-radicalized lone wolves. Both exhibit distinctive behavioral and communications patterns that can be detected—but only if intelligence agencies have the right data and tools to analyze it.

Yet Washington is blunting its surveillance powers. Collection of phone metadata under the Patriot Act was banned by Congress and finally ceased at the end of November. Collection of the contents of specific targets’ communications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been dumbed down, with onerous requirements to secure the authorizing court order. The intelligence community feels beleaguered and bereft of political support. What’s needed is a fundamental upgrade to America’s surveillance capabilities.

Congress should pass a law re-establishing collection of all metadata, and combining it with publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a comprehensive, searchable database. Legal and bureaucratic impediments to surveillance should be removed. That includes Presidential Policy Directive-28, which bestows privacy rights on foreigners and imposes burdensome requirements to justify data collection.

There has been much debate about whether providers of communications hardware and software in the U.S. should be obliged to give the government backdoor access. Such a mandate would do little good, since terrorists would simply switch to foreign or home-built encryption. New technologies can cloak messages in background noise, rendering them difficult to detect.

Forcing terrorists into encrypted channels, however, impedes their operational effectiveness by constraining the amount of data they can send and complicating transmission protocols, a phenomenon known in military parlance as virtual attrition. Moreover, the use of strong encryption in personal communications may itself be a red flag.

Still, the U.S. must recognize that encryption is bringing the golden age of technology-driven surveillance to a close, which necessitates robust human intelligence. Pursuing every lead on terrorist activity would require a substantial increase in FBI funding and personnel—perhaps double or triple the number of field agents capable of tracking suspects. The Paris attacks, whose perpetrators exchanged numerous unencrypted text messages, were a grim reminder that capable but overstretched security services cannot thwart every terrorist plot.

Congress and the administration should also reassure the intelligence community by reiterating their full support for current surveillance programs. Revitalizing cooperation with foreign intelligence partners, which greatly decreased in the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures, is essential. This would require serious dialogue between world leaders and assurances that security has been tightened to prevent similar leaks.

Enhanced congressional oversight—a true partnership between the executive and Congress—is needed. Each month the intelligence community should provide classified briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees on how surveillance programs are working, what actionable information has been developed, and whether mistakes or abuses have occurred. These briefings should be recorded, and lawmakers should sign an acknowledgment of their attendance. This would bolster accountability and ensure that nobody suffers a memory lapse, such as Nancy Pelosi’s failure to remember that she was extensively briefed on the CIA’s enhanced-interrogation program.

None of this can happen without a rigorous national debate about surveillance, launched by congressional hearings. A review of the post-9/11 surveillance successes and failures needs to be a prominent part of this discourse. Most disagreements on surveillance are about policy, not law: Reasonable warrantless searches are compatible with the Fourth Amendment. So are searches of data shared with third parties, such as social-media posts—a highly valuable surveillance window, since people undergoing radicalization are prone to showcase their zealotry online.

In the wake of 9/11, surveillance reforms were adopted virtually overnight, with little discussion; they did not last. Hence the importance of building enduring public support. Surveillance should feature prominently in the 2016 presidential campaign, giving the next commander in chief a mandate and sense of obligation to implement reforms. Opposition to surveillance has been bipartisan, and the strategy for overcoming it must be bipartisan too.

Assertive efforts to defeat Islamic State will diminish, but not eliminate, the threat. Quick response by law enforcement is vital to limiting casualties and neutralizing attackers but cannot entirely prevent terrorism. Even the best 21st-century surveillance system won’t have a 100% success rate. But robust surveillance, drawing on a variety of technical and human intelligence and backed up by rigorous investigation of all leads, is the best way to mitigate the threat.

Mr. Pompeo, a Republican from Kansas, sits on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Rivkin, a constitutional lawyer, dealt with intelligence oversight while serving in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-a-rigorous-national-debate-about-surveillance-1451856106

Obama’s empty climate agreement

Paris is Copenhagen all over again — more presidential climate change grandstanding without concrete results.

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. & ANDREW M. GROSSMAN, 10 December 2015 in USA Today

The world is watching as diplomats in Paris hammer out the final details of a new climate agreement involving over 150 countries. The goal, said President Barack Obama, is “an agreement where … each nation has the confidence that other nations are meeting their commitments.”

But the world’s attention may be misplaced. There is no reason to believe that this agreement will conclude any differently from the last three, with nations reneging on commitments to drive down greenhouse gas emissions and to provide billions of dollars in foreign aid to finance reductions in the developing world.

That’s a big problem for the president: reciprocity has always been Congress’s chief concern when it comes to climate-related measures that threaten to drive up energy prices and sap the United States’ international competitiveness. The lack of binding commitments for developing nations like China and India is a big part of what killed consideration of one previous agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, in the Senate. And that, as well as general opposition to new greenhouse emissions regulations by congressional Republicans, presages the same result in Congress this time around.

Despite the messaging coming from the White House, as a legal matter, the president actually does need Congress’s support to complete any kind of meaningful deal. That legal reality is having serious consequences in Paris, where U.S. participation in the final deal is an overriding imperative. For one, it rules out any firm financial commitments. The Constitution, after all, assigns the power of the purse to Congress, and so the president cannot, on his own, set the U.S. foreign aid budget for years into the future.

Likewise, the president cannot unilaterally commit the US to binding emission-reduction targets. The Senate and executive branch have both understood for years that any “targets and timetables” for emissions must be put to a ratification vote. When the Senate ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992, it extracted a promise from the George H.W. Bush administration to that effect. And when President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, it was failure to secure Senate ratification that blocked the U.S. from becoming a party and stopped it from becoming binding under U.S. law. In foreign-affairs law, these are extraordinarily strong precedent for the proposition that any binding reductions must be put to Congress.

The Obama administration’s solution to these seemingly intractable problems is to structure the deal as what it calls a “hybrid agreement.” Under this approach, only measures dealing with emissions reporting would be binding on parties. The rest would constitute what diplomats call “political commitments” — in other words, empty promises that are not legally enforceable. In short, the agreement will contain little in the way of substance.

That is not, however, how it will be touted to the American people. The administration, having identified the Paris agreement as a key plank of the president’s “climate legacy,” has sent a gaggle of senior officials to the negotiations and launched an all-out publicity barrage. The chief focus so far has been on the agreement’s longwinded aspirational language, including the likely-to-be-declared long-term goal of “decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century.” But that, like the other “commitments,” will have all the legal force of a fortune cookie message.

For those participating in the Paris talks, there should be a sense of déjà vu. The negotiations over the 2009 Copenhagen Accord marked the Obama administration’s climate-diplomacy debut, and the United States played a lead role in drafting the deal. Its key provisions? Aid payments to to developing nations and “quantified economy-wide emissions targets.” President Obama called it “meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough.” Structured to avoid the need for ratification, the accord was not legally enforceable and quickly came to be viewed, on its own terms, as a complete failure.

One that the president appears determined to repeat in Paris.

David B. Rivkin, Jr., who served in Republican administrations, and Andrew M. Grossman, who previously worked at The Heritage Foundation, are attorneys at Baker & Hostetler. 

Source: http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/12/10/paris-climate-change-constitution-treaty-column/76676732/

AUT–Austin’s Race-Conscious Policies

The Supreme Court may soon end racial discrimination disguised as ‘diversity.’

by DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. & ANDREW GROSSMAN, December 8, 2015, in the National Review

The don’t-ask-don’t-tell era of racial preferences in college admissions may soon be at an end, as Abigail Fisher’s challenge to the University of Texas’s affirmative-action program makes its second appearance before the Supreme Court, which will hear the case this Wednesday. 

Significantly, Ms. Fisher isn’t asking the Court to ban affirmative action. Instead, her case seeks to hold schools to the general rule that the government may employ race-based measures only as a last resort. And even then, such measures must be almost perfectly calibrated to serve a compelling interest — in this instance, achieving the educational benefits of diversity.

In the admissions context, those principles have too often been honored in the breach. And for that, blame the Court. Its 2003 decision upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative-action program combined the tough language typical of decisions reviewing race-conscious government policies with a loose and open-ended analysis of the way the program actually worked and the way it was justified.

University administrators took the decision as license to do what they pleased, never mind necessity or tailoring, so long as they stayed vague about the way their programs worked. Admissions at UT–Austin offer a case in point. In 2008, the year Ms. Fisher applied, the bulk of students (81 percent) were admitted under Texas’s Top Ten Percent law, which grants automatic admission to top students at Texas high schools. That alone made UT–Austin one of the most racially diverse campuses among elite public universities.

Nonetheless, the university layered on top of that base a race-conscious admissions program. The justification — which has changed several times over the seven years that the university has spent fighting Ms. Fisher’s lawsuit — was that the Top Ten admittees lacked what it called “qualitative diversity” or “diversity within diversity.” In other words, university officials felt, despite never having surveyed the relevant characteristics of minority students admitted under the Top Ten law, that they somehow lacked adequate diversity among themselves.

The resulting race-conscious program is called “holistic review.” The program bases admissions on a combination of academics and “personal achievement.” As part of the process, an admissions reviewer assigns each applicant a “personal achievement score,” ranging from 1 to 6, based on a laundry list of factors, including race. After the scores are assigned, applicants are selected, major by major, on the basis of grids that chart academic achievement against personal achievement. That means there is no way to know whether or how the use of race influenced any particular admissions decision.

If even this stripped-down summary sounds convoluted, there’s a reason for that: It is convoluted — and, by all appearances, deliberately so. The purpose is to obfuscate. And that’s a real problem for the university. Even putting aside whether UT can justify using race at all, given the enormous diversity it has achieved through race-neutral means, its holistic-review program is completely divorced from its rather specific “diversity within diversity” justification.

If one were trying to boost qualitative diversity, whatever exactly that may be, UT’s approach isn’t what any sane person would do. To begin with, it’s astonishingly arbitrary. Despite the enormous emphasis that admissions officials place on racial considerations, the decision of when to use race as a “plus” factor and how much weight to accord it are left entirely to the application reviewers, without specific guidance or oversight. The idea, presumably, is that they know what they’re looking for.

A sane person acting in good faith would place emphasis on transparency. UT does not. To the contrary, its holistic-review process could not have been made more opaque. Even the university has no way to oversee decisions regarding race because it has structured its process so that those decisions cannot be disentangled from the consideration of other factors.

Indeed, UT has gone to such lengths to obfuscate its use of race that it can’t even show that its application readers aren’t treating race as the defining factor in the applications they review, which would amount to a forbidden quota system.

A sane person would also focus on results. But the results of UT’s use of race are unmeasurable. The university cannot identify students admitted because of racial preferences and therefore has no ability to identify their characteristics or ascertain the impact of racial preferences on diversity at any level. In fact, UT’s admissions director conceded that he could not identify any applicant who had been admitted on the basis of race. He also didn’t see why that was a problem.

None of this is unique to UT. Many of the affirmative-action programs administered in the wake of the Court’s 2003 decision are similarly structured. Dissenting from the majority opinion in that case, Justice Anthony Kennedy warned that undue deference to schools would allow them to cite vague diversity interests as a pretext for unconstitutional discrimination. And that’s exactly what has happened.

The difference today is that the author of the Court’s 2003 decision, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, has been replaced on the bench by Justice Samuel Alito, who hews more closely to Justice Kennedy’s views on this subject. A constitutional corrective is in order. 

David B. Rivkin Jr. and Andrew Grossman practice appellate litigation in the Washington, D.C., office of Baker Hostetler, LLP. They filed an amicus brief for the Cato Institute in support of Ms. Fisher.

Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428157/universities-and-race

Obama’s Illegal Guantanamo Power Play

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. and LEE A. CASEY, in the Wall Street Journal

Dec. 2, 2015 6:51 p.m. ET

Two days after terrorists rampaged in Paris, the Obama administration announced that it had transferred five prisoners—including a former Osama bin Laden bodyguard—from the U.S. prison facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United Arab Emirates.

In the past several days, the White House has signaled that a more significant step is coming soon: the complete shutdown of the facility and the transfer of the remaining detainees—there are 107 at the moment—to sites on the U.S. mainland. Obama-administration surrogates say the president will effect the change by using his favorite tool, an executive order. But this would be utterly illegal, since Congress has specifically prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to U.S. soil.

Although the president’s war powers are broad and formidable, so are those of Congress. In particular, the Constitution specifically vests the legislative branch with the powers to “declare War”; to “raise and support Armies”; to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”; to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”; and to appropriate funds for all of these purposes. Continue reading

Congress Can Respond to Putin With More Sanctions

By PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY And DAVID B. RIVKIN JR., Oct. 4, 2015 6:11 p.m. ET

From Ukraine to Syria, the Obama administration has consistently misread Russian President Vladimir Putin ’s objectives and the implications of cooperating with him. This has led to costly failures, but the administration is unlikely to change its approach. Congress need not sit idle too. By enacting new sanctions on Russia, U.S. lawmakers can send a strong signal to Moscow that its continued aggression against Ukraine and growing complicity in a genocidal war in Syria will come at a heavy price.

After Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, the Obama administration and many U.S. allies imposed sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals. But those measures clearly haven’t been effective in discouraging Mr. Putin’s quest to exert Russian power and influence.

In Ukraine, despite the supposed cease-fire effected by the Minsk Accords negotiated by Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia, Moscow-supported aggression continues in the contested east. Russian troops remain in the region, as an extensive Sept. 14 report from the Atlantic Council documents, and Reuters has reported that new Russian military bases are being built.

In Syria, Mr. Putin, under the guise of fighting Islamic State, supports the Bashar Assad regime, which has used barrel bombs and chemical weapons in slaughtering tens of thousands of civilians, mostly Sunni Muslims—making Russia complicit in, and legally accountable for, these actions. The Obama administration over the past week has hinted that it might cooperate with Russia’s anti-ISIS campaign.

The danger of association with an aggressor like Mr. Putin, who is also working with Iraq and Iran, can be seen in Russian airstrikes over the past few days directed not at ISIS but at other opponents of the Assad regime. The Obama administration’s initial seeming openness to working with Mr. Putin in Syria has already compromised the White House’s ability to hold Moscow accountable on any front, including for its aggression in Ukraine.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the president has formidable authority for conducting foreign policy, but there are several steps—practical and symbolic—that Congress can take that would demonstrate a resolve toward Russia that hasn’t been forthcoming from the Obama administration.

On the symbolic side, Congress can legislate a finding, based on ample evidence, that the Russian military has committed war crimes in Ukraine, and is aiding and abetting the Assad regime’s genocide and Iran’s terrorism-sponsoring activities. Using the congressional bully pulpit can help drive the public debate, especially during the 2016 presidential election campaign.

Congress can also enact new sanctions that will have an immediate and profound effect—starting with the Russian oil-refining industry.

Despite Mr. Putin’s far-reaching strategic aspirations, Russia is punching well above its weight. The Russian economy continues to shrink, buffeted by falling oil prices and Western sanctions, and 2014 capital flight has exceeded $150 billion. Hundreds of Russian casualties in Ukraine are causing discontent, with Russian media reporting how Russian contract soldiers—in the part-volunteer, part-draftee military—are refusing to deploy to Ukraine or Syria. According to the Moscow-based independent polling organization Levada, fewer than 14% of Russians support military intervention in Syria.

Russia’s greatest vulnerability may be its refineries. While Russia is one of the world’s top energy producers, its refining facilities are antiquated, with low product quality, no spare capacity, and infrastructure in desperate need of significant investment. The refining infrastructure is so weak that Russia ran out of gasoline in 2011, precipitating shortages and substantial popular discontent. Russian media reported that the head of the majority-government-owned Rosneft oil company, Igor Sechin, sent Mr. Putin a letter on July 15 warning of a major shortfall in refined products by 2016-17 unless the refining sector gets emergency financial assistance.

Most of Russia’s approximately 50 major refineries date to the Soviet period. According to a 2014 report prepared for Russia’s parliament, the refiners also require a steady supply of Western, particularly American, equipment. Current U.S. sanctions apply only to new Russian oil and gas production projects. But an embargo—even if only a unilateral one by the U.S.—on exports of refinery pumps, compressors, control equipment and catalytic agents would cause widespread shortages of refined products, putting tremendous pressure on Russia’s civilian economy and Moscow’s ability to carry out military operations. The Putin regime would suffer major political damage.

President Obama might veto such refinery sanctions legislation because of its potentially drastic effect, but as Russia’s behavior becomes ever more outrageous, he might not be able to summon Democratic support as readily as he did for the Iranian nuclear deal. In any case, Congress would do well to make U.S. policy toward Russia a matter for serious discussion during an election year—and to remind Mr. Putin that with the Obama administration’s days dwindling, a significant course correction in U.S. foreign policy could be on the horizon.

Ms. Dobriansky is a former undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs in the George W. Bush administration. Mr. Rivkin is a constitutional lawyer who served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-can-respond-to-putin-with-more-sanctions-1443996688

A Win for Congress and a Setback for ObamaCare

By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR. And ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY

Sept. 10, 2015 7:46 p.m. ET

When the House of Representatives filed a lawsuit last year contesting President Obama’s implementation of ObamaCare, critics variously labeled it as “ridiculous,” “frivolous” and certain to be dismissed. Federal District Judge Rosemary Collyer apparently doesn’t agree. On Wednesday she ruled against the Obama administration, concluding that the House has standing to assert an injury to its institutional power, and that its lawsuit doesn’t involve—as the administration had asserted—a “political question” incapable of judicial resolution.

The House lawsuit involves two core allegations. First, the House contends that the executive branch has spent billions of dollars on ObamaCare’s “cost-sharing” subsidy, even though Congress hasn’t appropriated money for it. The House says the administration violated Article I, Section nine of the Constitution, which declares: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations Made by Law.”

Second, the House asserts that the administration has failed to faithfully execute ObamaCare’s employer mandate by issuing regulations lowering the percentage of employees who must be offered insurance and delaying the mandate’s effective date for two years.

The most specious but widespread objection to the lawsuit was that Congress, as an institution, is incapable of suffering an injury serious enough to establish “standing” to sue. Critics argued that, because the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd (1997) denied standing to a group of six congressmen who sued President Bill Clinton over his use of the line-item veto, there is no such thing as legislative standing.

But Raines never foreclosed legislative standing; it merely denied standing to six disgruntled members of Congress who had lost a political battle with their own colleagues. Raines didn’t involve a claim of institutional injury. The House lawsuit, by contrast, was authorized by a majority vote and does claim an institutional injury. In the words of Judge Collyer, the “plaintiff here is the House of Representatives, duly authorized to sue as an institution, not individual members as in Raines. . . . That important fact clearly distinguishes this case.”

Congress is not an institutional orphan, incapable of vindicating injury to its constitutional prerogatives. Indeed, just a few months ago, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court recognized that the Arizona legislature had standing to assert its claim that a state executive commission had usurped its power to initiate redistricting. Standing existed because the Arizona legislature was “an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury.”

Judge Collyer ruled that the House has standing to pursue its appropriations-related claims, but not its employer-mandate-related ones. Regarding the former, she recognized that the “genius of our Framers was to limit the Executive’s power” by reserving to Congress exclusive control over the federal purse. In her words, “Disregard for that reservation works a grievous harm on the House, which is deprived of its rightful and necessary place under our Constitution.”

The Obama administration contended that Congress could remedy its appropriations injury via “the elimination of funding” for ObamaCare. But as Judge Collyer noted, the administration was “apparently oblivious to the irony” of this argument, since a failure to appropriate money is, itself, an elimination of funding. She concluded, “Congress cannot fulfill its constitutional role if it specifically denies funding and the Executive simply finds money elsewhere without consequence.”

While Judge Collyer correctly permitted the appropriations claim to move forward, she incorrectly concluded that “the Employer-Mandate Theory is fundamentally a statutory argument” that merely asserts that the administration is “misinterpreting” ObamaCare. She was mistaken in asserting that other, private litigants are “free to sue” over such misinterpretation. Several private plaintiffs have already tried to litigate these misinterpretations, and federal courts in both the seventh and 11th circuits have held that they, too, lack standing.

When neither Congress nor private litigants have standing to challenge an executive’s unilateral rewriting of a statute, the executive possesses a dangerous, unchecked legislative power.

If the “genius of our Framers was to limit the Executive’s power,” as Judge Collyer wrote, by reserving to Congress exclusive control over the federal purse, the Founders were equally inspired in giving Congress exclusive control over legislation and obligating the president to “faithfully” execute such laws.

“The power of executing the laws,” the Supreme Court emphasized in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (2014), “does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.” If a law has defects, fixing them lies solely within Congress’s legislative power, not with the executive branch. Disregard for this aspect of congressional power—not merely its appropriations power—also amounts to a “grievous harm on the House” sufficient for institutional standing.

As for the Obama administration’s Hail Mary claim that the House lawsuit involved a “political question” that shouldn’t be taken up by the judiciary, disputes between Congress and the executive have been decided by the courts since Marbury v. Madison in 1803. As Judge Collyer put it, “the mere fact that the House of Representatives is the plaintiff does not turn this suit into a non-justiciable ‘political’ dispute.” You could almost say the administration’s claim was ridiculous, frivolous—and, as of Wednesday, resoundingly dismissed.

Mr. Rivkin is a constitutional litigator who has served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Ms. Foley is a constitutional law professor at Florida International University College of Law.

Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-win-for-congress-and-a-setback-for-obamacare-1441928788

A side agreement could void the Iran deal

By Mike Pompeo and David B. Rivkin Jr., September 6 2015 7:07PM in the Washington Post

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, which requires the president to submit to Congress the nuclear agreement reached with Iran, represents an exceptional bipartisan congressional accommodation. Instead of submitting an agreement through the constitutionally proper mechanism — as a treaty requiring approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate — the act enables President Obama to go forward with the deal unless Congress disapproves it by a veto-proof margin. Unfortunately, the president has not complied with the act, jeopardizing his ability to implement the agreement.

The act defines “agreement,” with exceptional precision, to include not only the agreement between Iran and six Western powers but also “any additional materials related thereto, including . . . side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.” But the president has not given Congress a key side agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This document describes how key questions about the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program will be resolved, as well as the precise operational parameters of the verification regime to which Tehran will be subject.

This omission has important legal consequences. At the heart of the act is a provision, negotiated between Congress and the White House, freezing the president’s ability to “waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran” while Congress is reviewing the agreement.

That review period was supposed to take 60 days and is triggered the day the president submits the agreement to Congress. However, because the president failed to submit the agreement in full, as the law requires, the 60-day clock has not started, and the president remains unable lawfully to waive or lift statutory Iran-related sanctions. Indeed, since the act also provides for the transmittal of the agreement to Congress between July 10 and Sept. 7, the president’s ability to waive statutory sanctions will remain frozen in perpetuity if Congress does not receive the full agreement Monday .

Congress must now confront the grave issues of constitutional law prompted by the president’s failure to comply with his obligations under the act. This is not the first time this administration has disregarded clear statutory requirements, encroaching in the process upon Congress’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives. The fact that this has happened again in the context of a national security agreement vital to the United States and its allies makes the situation all the more serious.

For Congress to vote on the merits of the agreement without the opportunity to review all of its aspects would both effectively sanction the president’s unconstitutional conduct and be a major policy mistake. Instead, both houses should vote to register their view that the president has not complied with his obligations under the act by not providing Congress with a copy of an agreement between the IAEA and Iran, and that, as a result, the president remains unable to lift statutory sanctions against Iran. Then, if the president ignores this legal limit on his authority, Congress can and should take its case to court.

Mike Pompeo, a Republican, represents Kansas in the House and is a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. David B. Rivkin Jr., a constitutional litigator and a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, served in the Justice Department and the White House Counsel’s Office during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-side-agreement-could-void-the-iran-deal/2015/09/06/f35ce8aa-532d-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html